Watch this video of Sandip Bhagat, our Chief Investment Officer, discussing the latest market insights.

Slow... But Steady

The last four years have felt like one endless blur of unprecedented events ... all unfolding in rapid succession. And 2023 was no different; it was perhaps even more extraordinary than the previous three years.

The surprises in 2023 were numerous. Much like the spectacular spike in inflation, the pace of disinflation in 2023 was remarkably rapid as well. Even as long-term interest rates rose unexpectedly in the second half, the U.S. economy remained remarkably resilient. As a result, U.S. large cap stocks performed magnificently in 2023 as the S&P 500 index gained 26.3%.

At the dawn of a new year, we reflect on our 2023 predictions with fond satisfaction.

We had practically ruled out the possibility of a deep and protracted recession in 2023. Our base case for the economy last year was a soft landing – with a short and shallow recession as the worst case scenario.

Our optimism on economic growth was based on what we believed were under-appreciated tailwinds from the post-pandemic stimulus. We perceived that the residual effects of prior monetary and fiscal stimulus were likely to offset the headwinds of higher inflation and higher interest rates.

Our view on inflation at the beginning of 2023 was relatively benign. We felt that fears of sticky and stubborn inflation were overblown. We predicted that core measures of inflation would be closer to 3% by the end of 2023. As a result, we also felt that the Fed would end up with more flexibility on future rate cuts than it believed or the market expected.

And finally, our constructive views were also reflected in our stock market outlook for 2023. We had ruled out the possibility of retesting prior lows in stock prices or making new ones. Our expectation for solid double-digit gains was based on the view that earnings growth would bottom out by mid-2023 and then rise subsequently.

We are pleased that these views were validated by what transpired in 2023. We were misguided, however, in our forecast that bonds would provide a decent term premium. Bonds were in negative territory for most of 2023 and finally eked out positive returns in the midst of high volatility.

Today, the odds of a recession have receded significantly and a soft landing is now the consensus view. We begin to develop our 2024 outlook from this vantage point.

Drivers Of The 2024 Outlook

Even as market optimism turned higher at the end of 2023, a number of concerns still linger in the minds of investors. Here, in no particular order, we walk through a long list of worries that investors may yet harbor.

  • An inverted yield curve has been a reliable predictor of recessions in the past. At this point, the yield curve has been inverted for more than 300 days.
  • Leading economic indicators have declined steadily for almost a year and a half.
  • Bank deposit growth and money supply growth are both in negative territory and close to levels seen in the 1930s.
  • The adverse economic effects of Fed tightening tend to be felt on a lagged basis – many fear the worst is yet to come.
  • The last mile of disinflation may prove difficult or even elusive.
  • The Fed may make a mistake by keeping policy too restrictive and interest rates too high for too long.
  • And finally, investors fret that stock valuations and earnings growth expectations are too high.

We address these concerns in forming our 2024 outlook by taking a closer look at inflation, growth, interest rates, profit margins, stock valuations and the earnings outlook.

Our headline summary is more constructive than the concerns highlighted above.

a. We believe GDP growth will continue to slow but only to below-trend levels; it is unlikely to turn negative.

b. We assign low odds to a moderate or deep recession and believe that growth may surprise to the upside.

c. Inflation will continue to recede but may normalize above the Fed’s 2% target.

d. Earnings may exceed expectations due to a potential improvement in profit margins.

e. We expect that both stocks and bonds will deliver modestly positive returns.

We validate our outlook with a closer look at four key fundamental drivers: inflation, interest rates, growth and earnings.

Inflation

We have made significant progress with disinflation in recent months ... probably more than many had expected.

And yet, two concerns remain on the inflation front.

  1. Will any unusual economic strength rekindle inflation and send it higher?
  2. Will the last leg of disinflation simply be too stubborn and difficult to achieve?

Inflation is unlikely to revert meaningfully higher for a number of reasons.

One, the sticky shelter component of inflation has just turned the corner and will continue to head predictably lower.

Two, the job market has long peaked in strength and will continue to weaken further. This will exert downward pressure on wage inflation.

And finally, we believe that the recent gains in productivity will continue into 2024.

Pandemic-related disruptions caused productivity to plummet. Employers had to scramble to train new workers who initially were not as productive as their predecessors. As the labor force normalizes, a pickup in productivity gains will ease overall inflation.

And this brings us to our second question: Can inflation subside all the way down to the Fed’s 2% target? And if so, how soon?

Our view here is a bit mixed. We believe inflation will continue its orderly decline in 2024. We expect headline and core inflation to soon head below 3%. However, we suspect that inflation may eventually come to rest below 2.5%, but above the Fed’s 2% target.

A couple of factors inform our view here. We expect growth to remain modestly resilient in 2024. We also expect an ageing population to constrain labor supply and put a higher floor on wage inflation.

Finally, we believe that even inflation of almost 2.5% will still be favorable for stocks and bonds.

Interest Rates

Our positive outlook on inflation makes it easy to develop a view on interest rates. We begin with the Fed and then move to long-term interest rates.

The Fed’s policy rate of 5.4% is already far above inflation which is averaging 3-3.5% on a year-over- year basis. The implied short-term real interest rate, which is simply the spread between policy rates and inflation, of 2-2.5% is already quite restrictive. We rule out any further rate hikes; the Fed is done with tightening.

Figure 1 shows just how restrictive Fed policy has become in recent months.

Source:  FactSet

The blue bars in Figure 1 show 12-month core PCE inflation (PCE stands for Personal Consumption Expenditures). Core PCE is the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge.

We can see how core PCE has fallen steadily in 2023 and is projected by the Fed itself to fall further in 2024.

The green line shows the Fed funds rate which is now higher than inflation by well over 2%. Under normal conditions, the Fed funds rate exceeds inflation by about 0.5%. A real short-term interest rate in excess of 2% is clearly restrictive. If inflation falls by another 1% or so in 2024, the Fed will have the flexibility to cut rates several times.

We expect five to seven rate cuts in 2024 beginning in March or May.

We are cognizant of the possibility that the Fed begins later and implements fewer rate cuts. Such a policy misstep would undoubtedly magnify the depth of the slowdown. But it is still unlikely to be a devastating event for the markets; we reckon the economy is just less rate-sensitive now than before.

Our view on the 10-year Treasury bond yield is derived from our outlook on inflation. We expect inflation to normalize below 2.5% in 2024. We expect a positively sloped yield curve to evolve over time. We also predict positive real rates and a positive term premium in the future.

We coalesce these thoughts to form our forecast for the 10-year Treasury bond yield in the range of 3.7-3.9%.

Growth Prospects

A long list of reliable indicators argue for a traditional, perhaps even a deep, recession in 2024 – just like they did in 2023.

In 2023, our counter-view on the topic was based on the under-appreciated tailwinds of massive prior stimulus from 2020 to 2022. A simple example of this support was the excess savings that consumers had accumulated from the post-pandemic fiscal stimulus. One of the legacies of ultra-low interest rates from that period was that consumer and corporate debt got locked in at low fixed rates.

For 2024, we argue against a modest or deep recession along different lines.

The biggest concerns right now revolve around the consumer and the job market. Many fear that it is only a matter of time before the consumer wilts under the pressure of high interest rates. And as the job market begins to soften, the skeptics fear it will eventually lead to the dreaded 1% increase in the unemployment rate.

We tend to disagree with both narratives.

We have pointed out extensively that the U.S. economy is less sensitive to interest rates now than it has been in the past. The consumer may, therefore, be more insulated from the lagged effects of Fed tightening. We also note that discretionary spending for lower income households is more affected by rent, food and energy costs than it is by interest rates.

And as resilient as the job market has been, we find it hard to believe that the unemployment rate will go above 4.5%. So far, employers have hoarded labor to prevent disruptions; we expect this trend to continue.

We conclude with our key under-appreciated takeaway on the growth front. Lower inflation in 2024 will help support consumer spending and offset the lagged impact of higher interest rates.

Earnings Outlook

Stocks have sold off in the early going so far in 2024. There is now a growing sense of foreboding that both earnings expectations and stock valuations may be too high. It is feared that these, in turn, may lead to mediocre stock market returns in 2024.

S&P 500 earnings for 2024 are projected to grow by about 11%.

Investors perceive risk in this 11% earnings growth estimate for 2024 because of a well-documented historical pattern. Analysts chronically overestimate earnings at the beginning of a year. As the year progresses, those estimates come down predictably by 4 to 8 percentage points.

We are aware and respectful of that trend. However, we identify a couple of potential positive offsets to that downtrend.

Profit margins have been compressing for the last year and a half because of high inflation. Higher input costs for labor and raw materials generally cause margins to decline.

We see this downtrend in Figure 2.

Source: FactSet

Inflation in 2024 will be a lot lower than it was in 2022 and 2023. We expect that a lower cost of goods sold will improve profit margins and provide some upside to earnings. The decline in interest rates should also help profit margins to some extent.

We also note that earnings have been unusually erratic in the last ten years or so. A crisis in commodities and currencies roiled markets in 2016. The Trump tax cuts abruptly boosted earnings in 2018. The pandemic wreaked havoc in 2020 and then war and excessive stimulus unleashed inflation and curtailed profits in 2022 and 2023. We see this wayward trajectory of earnings in Figure 3.

Source:  FactSet

S&P 500 earnings per share for 2023 will likely come in within a range of 219-220. This is well below the trend level of earnings assuming historical growth rates from 2015 onwards. We notice that even the 244 level of earnings forecasted for 2024 remains below the trend line of normalized earnings. As macro headwinds diminish, we are optimistic that the consensus earnings forecast for 2024 will be met or exceeded.

And finally, a word on stock valuations.

The forward P/E ratio for the S&P 500 currently stands at about 19 times. While it is high by historical standards, it is not so different from recent averages. We believe that the stock market is gradually evolving to a structurally higher normalized P/E than its long- term historical average.

The S&P 500 index in aggregate produces free cash flow margins of about 10% and return on equity of around 20%. These are unprecedented levels of high profitability. We believe these are sustainable levels of profitability for large U.S. companies going forward and, therefore, supportive of higher stock valuations.

We are more tolerant of today’s P/E ratios than most investors.

2024 Outlook

We are aware of the long list of indicators that still argue in favor of a recession. These include the continued inversion of the yield curve, steadily declining leading economic indicators and negative growth in bank deposits.

  1. We acknowledge these factors will continue to slow down growth. Our base case calls for below- trend, but still positive, GDP growth. Our worst case scenario is a short and shallow recession. We assign low odds to a traditional or deep recession.
  2. Lower inflation in 2024 will support consumer spending and offset any lagged effects of higher interest rates. Even as the job market softens, the unemployment rate will remain well below 4.5%.
  3. We do not anticipate any meaningful uptick in inflation from here on. Inflation should continue to decline in a fairly orderly manner to below 2.5%. The impetus for lower inflation in 2024 will come from declining shelter inflation, a weaker job market and continued productivity gains.
  4. It may be difficult to achieve the Fed’s 2% inflation goal in the next couple of years. A higher floor on inflation may emerge from a couple of factors: modestly resilient growth in the near term and an ageing population which limits labor supply in the long run.
  5. With the significant progress on disinflation, the Fed is already quite restrictive in its policy. If inflation falls further in 2024, the Fed will have the flexibility to cut rates several times. We expect five to seven rate cuts in 2024 beginning in March or May. We expect the 10-year Treasury bond yield to normalize just below 4%.
  6. We are more comfortable with earnings estimates and stock valuations than the current consensus view. We believe that lower inflation in 2024 will lead to higher profit margins overall. We also believe that higher P/E ratios are fundamentally supported by the higher profitability of companies within the S&P 500 index.

  7. We do not expect political or geopolitical risks to materially affect stock or bond returns.
  8. For calendar year 2024, we forecast mid-single digit bond returns and high single digit stock returns. We see more upside for stocks than we do for bonds. We remain bullish on stocks but at a lower portfolio weight than in prior years.

We are confident that the battle against inflation has been largely won and will soon come to an end. Investor focus is now squarely on growth, which becomes the key determinant of investment performance.

We realize that a lot of uncertainty still persists about the future trajectory of economic and earnings growth. As a result, we emphasize high quality and sustainable competitive advantages in our investment decisions. After a highly rewarding year, we will exercise even more caution and care in client portfolios.

 

We believe GDP growth will continue to slow but only to below-trend levels; it is unlikely to turn negative.

 

Inflation will continue to recede but may normalize above the Fed’s 2% target.

 

Earnings may exceed expectations due to a potential improvement in profit margins.

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Rising Interest Rates

The speed and magnitude of economic developments in recent years have been nothing short of remarkable.  The last four years have felt like one endless sequence of unprecedented events in rapid succession.

2023 has been almost as extraordinary as the previous three years.  Much like the spectacular spike in inflation, the pace of disinflation in 2023 has been remarkably rapid as well.  Headline CPI inflation has fallen from above 9% to around 3% in the last five quarters.  Core PCE inflation is now below 4% year-over-year and has grown at an annualized pace of just about 2% in the last three months.  

The U.S. economy has also been remarkably resilient in the third quarter of 2023.  As a result, the odds of a recession have receded steadily in the minds of investors.  On one hand, this combination of lower-than-expected inflation and higher-than-expected growth should have given investors reason to celebrate.  After all, it could have been viewed as a successful milestone in the journey to a soft landing.

However, these hopes are now at risk from perhaps the most remarkable outcome of the third quarter – a sharp rise in long-term interest rates.  A swift increase of more than 1% in the 10-year Treasury bond yield was the primary driver of the stock and bond market selloff in September.

The recent market turbulence has ignited renewed fears about the future trajectories for growth and inflation.  The potential outcomes range from stagflation in the near term to a deeper eventual recession from the adverse impact of higher interest rates.  

We focus our analysis here on answering two key questions.  

  • Why have long-term rates risen so sharply?  
  • And what are the likely implications of such an increase? 

Drivers of Higher Rates

Just as it appeared that we may be reaching the end of this tightening cycle, the Fed emphatically signaled a “higher for longer” stance at its September meeting.  The hawkish Fed announcement on the monetary front coincided with a political disagreement on the level of government spending and fueled another upward spiral in long-term interest rates.

In its simplest fundamental framework, changes in long-term interest rates are influenced by three factors.

  1. Changes in inflation expectations
  2. Changes in growth expectations
  3. Changes in the “term risk premium” or compensation for bearing interest rate risk 

We take a closer look at each of these factors.  Along the way, we also identify some peripheral influences that may be exerting upward pressure on long rates.

Probably Not Driven by Inflation

We have made significant progress with disinflation in recent months … probably more than many had expected.  And yet the concern remains that inflation is still above 2% and any unusual economic strength will simply stoke it further, send rates higher and trigger an even deeper recession down the line.

We believe that inflation is firmly on its way down and remain optimistic that the recent trend of disinflation will continue.  We summarize our inflation outlook in Figure 1 below.

Source:  Factset

The dark blue line in Figure 1 shows headline CPI inflation.  It peaked at 9.1% in June 2022 and has since declined to 3.7% in August.  By now, it looks like we are well past the peak in inflation.   

The small spike in headline inflation at the far right is attributable to the recent rise in oil prices.  Barring a major escalation of geopolitical risks, we believe there is limited upside to oil prices after these gains.  Besides, energy costs are notoriously volatile and core inflation, which excludes food and energy, remains in steady decline.

The decline in core inflation is particularly encouraging because it is known to be sticky.  Wages are a key component of core inflation.  The green line in Figure 1 shows growth in average hourly earnings as a proxy for wage inflation.

Wage inflation peaked almost a year and a half ago at around 6%.  It has since fallen steadily to just above 4%.  It is interesting that we have achieved this disinflation without any major disruption in the labor market.  

The light blue bars in Figure 1 show that the unemployment rate was steady between 3.4% and 3.8% as wage inflation declined from 6% to 4%.  This leads us to believe that we have not yet seen meaningful demand destruction.  Instead, we suspect that the pandemic created transitory supply side shocks which have since abated to provide meaningful disinflationary relief.

We conclude from Figure 1 that recent disinflationary trends remain intact and will likely persist as the economy cools further in response to higher interest rates.

We have further evidence to support our conclusion that inflation is not the primary driver of higher long-term interest rates.  Figure 2 shows 10-year Treasury yields and 10-year breakeven inflation expectations priced into inflation-protected bonds.

Source: Factset

The dark blue line in Figure 2 shows the dramatic increase in 10-year Treasury yields in recent weeks.  The 10-year breakeven inflation rate in light blue has remained virtually unchanged over that period.  Investors are clearly not pushing long-term interest rates higher because of higher inflation expectations over the next 10 years.

Likely Not Triggered by Growth Either

Since inflation expectations have remained practically unchanged, the rise in nominal interest rates has essentially led to an increase in real (nominal minus inflation) interest rates.

A typical driver of changes in real interest rates tends to be a change in growth expectations.  At first glance, it is tempting to attribute higher long-term interest rates to higher long-term growth expectations.  After all, we did allude earlier to unexpected recent resilience in economic activity.  

But we rule out this possibility on further reflection.  Yes, the odds of a recession in the near term may have receded.  But it is unlikely that a burst of economic strength in the short run could materially increase long-term growth rates over the next 10, 20 and 30 years.

In fact, we know that the two drivers of long-term real GDP growth are labor force growth and productivity growth.  We show how these building blocks have historically contributed to the potential growth rate of the U.S. economy in Figure 3.

Whittier Trust - Potential Real GDP Growth Rates

Source:  Congressional Budget Office 1950-2022, Whittier Projections 2023-2033

We can think of the potential growth rate of an economy as the natural speed limit at which it can operate without unleashing inflation.  

We see in Figure 3 that the potential GDP growth rate of the U.S. economy has slowed steadily over the last 70 years.  Productivity gains held steady for most of that period before falling in the Global Financial Crisis and the Covid pandemic.

However, an aging population has dramatically altered the growth dynamics of the U.S. economy.  As the baby boomers age, the labor force participation rate has declined steadily in recent years.  Labor force growth has slowed down from around 2% in the first 40 years of this period to barely 0.5% in the last 15 years. 

We project that this trend will continue well into the future.  Demographic shifts are slow to unfold and predictable in their evolution.

We see nothing to suggest that the long-term potential GDP growth rate of the U.S. economy has risen in recent months.  It is unlikely that changes in growth expectations can explain the rise in long-term interest rates.  

We recognize that a dramatic shift in immigration policy or a significant increase in AI-induced productivity growth could change this dynamic.  But we see these as more speculative possibilities at the moment.

Conceivably Related to Policy Risk

We finally assess if investors are pricing in a greater level of risk and uncertainty in their outlook for bonds.  In that scenario, investors would demand greater compensation for bearing the risk of investing in long-term bonds in the form of lower prices and higher yields.

Let’s look separately at the risk of misguided central bank monetary policies and imprudent fiscal spending policies from the central government.

We know the Fed has signaled a higher-for-longer stance on short-term interest rates.  The big risk with this approach is that monetary policy may become too restrictive at some point and throw the economy into a recession.  However, such an outcome would lead to declining, not rising, long-term interest rates. 

While monetary policy risk doesn’t inform our current inquiry into rising long rates, we will come back to it in the next section on the implications of higher short-term and long-term interest rates.

After ruling out inflation, growth and monetary policy risks as drivers of higher long-term rates, we may finally have a plausible candidate in the form of higher fiscal policy risk.  

Federal debt has risen sharply as a result of the fiscal stimulus provided during the pandemic; it now stands at $33 trillion and 120% of GDP.  While the magnitude of this debt burden has been known for some time now and is hardly new information, investors may finally be getting concerned about the lack of both fiscal discipline and bipartisan alignment in Washington.  

The Congressional Budget Office now projects the public debt to GDP ratio to reach 200% in the next 30 years.  And the political dysfunction in recent months has ranged from a protracted battle on the debt ceiling to a near-shutdown of the government and a subsequent change in House leadership from a revolt by Republican hardliners.  In the meantime, interest rate volatility has picked up and bonds are now poised to generate negative total returns for an unprecedented third consecutive year.  

It is quite possible that investors are repricing long-term bonds to higher yields in response to greater fiscal policy risk and higher asset class risk.

We also suspect that a couple of other factors may be accentuating the sharp rise in bond yields.  After the debt ceiling crisis in May, Treasury issuance has been higher while Japan and China have reduced their purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds.  

The imbalance arising from more supply and less demand may be creating a liquidity-driven price dislocation in the near term.  And we would not rule out a speculative momentum-driven trend that continues to push prices lower and yields higher.

We summarize this section by attributing the recent rise in interest rates to a repricing of fiscal policy and asset class risks.  In the process, we observe that neither long-term inflation expectations nor growth expectations have changed materially.  

We also believe that short-term liquidity effects and speculation may have pushed interest rates beyond fair values based on the fundamental repricing of risks.  We believe that the 10-year and 30-year Treasury bond yields are likely to normalize closer to 4% than above 5% in the coming months.

We next look at the likely impact of rising rates on the economy and markets.

Implications of Higher Rates

Rapid monetary tightening has led to financial accidents in the past.  We almost got one in March in the form of a banking crisis.  However, prompt and powerful policy actions contained the damage to the collapse of just a handful of regional banks.

The prospect of higher rates for longer is now raising concerns about what might break next.  As these worries mount, investors are starting to bring the hard landing scenario back to the fore again.  

Higher Recession Odds?

The ability of the U.S. economy to first withstand high inflation and now higher interest rates has caught many by surprise.  Based on history, many conventional indicators have already been predicting the onset of a recession by now.  

The more notable ones include an inverted yield curve for over a year, a continuous decline in the Leading Economic Indicators index for almost a year and a half and a collapse in year-over-year money supply growth to levels last seen in the Great Depression.

Instead, the job market and the consumer have remained resilient.  Does the solid job market run the risk of creating an economy that is still too hot and, therefore, poised to unleash inflation at any moment?  We don’t believe so.  

Job growth has now declined steadily for several months from its torrid stimulus-induced pace.  And the consumer and the economy will continue to face future headwinds from the eventual lagged effects of higher interest rates, the depletion of excess savings from the Covid stimulus and the resumption of student loan repayments.

We also show how higher interest rates may affect consumer spending differently than they have in the past.

Mortgages and auto loans are two of the bigger components of household debt.  Consumers locked in low rates on those debt obligations during the long periods of easy money between 2008 and 2021.  We see that clearly in Figure 4.

Source: WSJ, Moody’s Analytics

Only 11% of outstanding household debt in 2023 carries rates that fluctuate with benchmark interest rates.  By contrast, this proportion was above 35% in the late 1980s.  

Although floating rates on credit card loans are rising with the Fed’s tightening, a significant portion of consumer debt is fixed at low rates from a few years ago.  This has allowed many households to continue spending despite the rise in interest rates.

Also, households are still paying less than 10% of their disposable income to stay current on their debts even with higher rates.  This is well below the high from 2008 and is also lower than the post-crisis average.

We believe the prevalence of fixed-rate debt on consumer balance sheets has made the U.S. economy less rate-sensitive.  

Here are a few observations which highlight a similar effect on corporate balance sheets and income statements.

  • Corporations also refinanced a lot of their debt to longer maturities at lower fixed rates.  Almost half of S&P 500 debt is set to mature after 2030.
  • The notional share of investment grade and high yield debt maturing within two years is around 15%, well below its 25% share in 2008.
  • Despite the sharp increase in Fed funds rates, net interest payments for companies in 2023 are actually lower than they were a year ago.

We acknowledge that the lagged effects of higher rates will continue to slow growth.  We do not, however, expect a significant recession in 2024.

Policy and Portfolio Considerations

The Fed funds rate is currently at 5.4%.  The latest Fed projections point to one more rate hike in 2023 and two rate cuts in 2024.  With policy rates projected to remain above 5% for over a year, we understand investor concerns about a potential Fed misstep.  

As inflation falls below 4%, short-term interest rates are becoming restrictive by historical standards.  Any continued decline in inflation will make current monetary policy even more restrictive.  The resulting increase in real rates could trigger a recession.  

While we recognize this risk, we feel that a sufficiently responsive Fed will manage to avoid it.  To the extent that the next recession will be induced by Fed policy, we believe the Fed will also have the ability to manage it before it becomes entrenched. 

We believe that the growing evidence of a slowing economy and declining inflation gives the Fed more flexibility than what can be inferred from their forecasts.  We discuss potential Fed actions across different economic outcomes.

Let’s assume that growth begins to slow materially to risk a recession.  In this setting, inflation is also likely to come down.  Now the Fed no longer needs to be restrictive because the inflation war has been won; it can begin to cut rates.  However, if inflation doesn’t subside to desired levels, it may well be on the heels of a stronger economy in which case a recession becomes moot.

We do not expect to see either of the two scenarios that invalidates our outlook – high inflation in the midst of a recession or a stubborn Fed which keeps rates high going into a recession.

At a portfolio level, we remain constructive on both the stock and bond markets.  Long-term bond yields have already risen significantly.  The 10-year bond yield reached a high of 4.88% in the first week of October; we believe it may have more room to fall from this level than to rise further.  Bonds have clearly repriced to offer more compensation to investors.

The rise in interest rates has also taken a toll on stocks.  By the first week of October, stocks had fallen by almost -8% from their July highs.  On one hand, the rise in interest rates reduces stock valuations.  On the other hand, lower odds of a recession improve cash flows.  At current valuations, we believe stocks still offer above-average returns relative to bonds over the next year.  

Summary

We set out to understand the drivers and implications of the recent rise in long-term interest rates.  Here is a summary of our key observations.

  • We rule out higher inflation, growth and monetary risk as the drivers behind the recent rise in long-term interest rates.
  • Instead, we attribute the recent rate increases to a higher risk premium (i.e. risk compensation), reduced liquidity and greater speculation.
  • Monetary policy is getting restrictive and, even without any more rate hikes, will become more so if we see less inflation.
  • Policymakers will eventually avoid the risk of major financial accidents from remaining overly restrictive.
  • Both stocks and bonds are attractive after repricing lower in recent weeks.

We recognize that the coast is far from clear and a lot of uncertainty still persists.  We respect the need for greater vigilance in portfolio management during these turbulent times.  We continue to exercise caution and care in client portfolios.

 

The recent rise in long-term interest rates has renewed fears about the future trajectories for growth and inflation.

 

Long-term bonds are likely pricing in greater fiscal policy risk and higher asset class risk.

 

Both stocks and bonds are attractive after repricing lower in recent weeks.

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De-Dollarization

Financial markets defied expectations as fears of a sharp and imminent recession failed to materialize. The S&P 500 index gained 16.9% in the first half of 2023. The Nasdaq 100 index soared 39.4% to lead the stock market rally. And even the lagging Russell 2000 index of small company stocks showed belated signs of life and rose 8.1%. As the economy showed unexpected signs of strength, the 10-year Treasury bond yield rose above 3.8% after trading below 3.3% in early April.

Headline inflation also surprised investors with a more rapid rate of decline than expected. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) stands at 4.0% year-over-year as of May 2023 … well below its June 2022 high of 9.1%. The Fed’s preferred inflation gauge based on Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) is also significantly lower at 3.8% through May. Core inflation measures remain sticky for the moment but are expected to decline meaningfully in coming months.

The impact of this progress on inflation has been felt in many different areas. The Fed stopped its string of 10 consecutive rate hikes in June. It has also signaled that the skip in rate hikes could eventually lead to a longer pause in the tightening cycle. The Fed’s shift in monetary policy from rapid tightening also spilled over into other markets.

The prospects of eventually lower policy rates along with unexpected economic resilience triggered the stock market rally. And more importantly for our discussion here, it continued to extend the recent bout of U.S. dollar weakness. The direction of the dollar has recently become a topic of intense debate as a number of threats have emerged to its status as the world’s reserve currency.

We assess the outlook for the U.S. dollar in light of the recent trend towards de-dollarization. We focus specifically on the following topics.

  • Recent catalysts for de-dollarization
  • Viable alternatives to the dollar
  • Fundamental drivers of dollar strength

Let’s begin with a brief history of events that have led to the hegemony of the dollar so far.

A Brief History

We can think of a reserve currency as one that is held by central banks in significant quantities. It also tends to play a prominent role in global trade and international investments. The last couple of centuries have essentially seen two primary reserve currencies.

The British pound sterling was the dominant reserve currency in the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century. The United Kingdom was the major exporter of manufactured goods and services at that time, and a large share of global trade was settled in pounds. The decline of the British Empire and the incidence of two World Wars and a Great Depression in between forced a realignment of the world financial order.

The dollar began to replace the pound as the dominant reserve currency after World War II. A new international monetary system emerged under the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, which centered on the U.S. dollar. Countries agreed to settle international balances in dollars with an understanding that the U.S. would ensure the convertibility of dollars to gold at a fixed price of $35 per ounce.

The Bretton Woods system remained in place until 1971, when President Nixon ended the dollar’s convertibility to gold. As we are well aware today, the U.S. typically runs a balance-of-payments deficit in global trade by importing more than it exports. In this setting, it became hard for the U.S. to redeem dollars for gold at a fixed price as foreign-held dollars began to exceed the U.S. gold stock.

The dollar continued to maintain its dominant role even after the end of the gold standard. Its position was further bolstered in 1974 when the U.S. came to an agreement with Saudi Arabia to denominate the oil trade in dollars. Since most countries import oil, it made sense for them to build up dollar reserves to guard against oil shocks. The dollar reserves also became a useful hedge for less developed economies against sudden domestic collapses.

The dollar’s hegemonic status is important to the U.S. economy and capital markets and their continued dominance in the global economic order. The U.S. is unique in that it also runs a fiscal deficit where the government spends more than it collects in revenues. The U.S. dollar hegemony is central to this rare ability of the U.S. to run twin deficits on both the fiscal and trade fronts.

The virtuous cycle begins with a willingness by other countries to accept dollars as payment for their exports. As they accumulate surpluses denominated in dollars, the attractiveness of the U.S. economy and the faith in U.S. institutions then bring those same dollars back into Treasury bonds to fund our deficit and into other U.S. assets to promote growth.

The dominance of the dollar in the world’s currency markets is truly remarkable. Our research indicates that the dollar currently accounts for more than 80% of foreign exchange trading, almost 60% of global central bank reserves and over 50% of global trade invoicing.

The importance of dollar hegemony cannot be overstated. At the same time, its dominance in perpetuity also cannot be taken for granted. In fact, the constant assault on the dollar has already seen its share of foreign exchange reserves decline from over 70% in 1999 to just below 60% now.

A number of new threats to the dollar have emerged within the last year or so. These developments have triggered renewed fears of de-dollarization and are worthy of discussion.

Recent De-Dollarization Catalysts

The main impetus for de-dollarization in recent months stems from a rise in geopolitical tensions. The war in Ukraine has played a meaningful role in the escalation of these risks. The U.S. and its Western allies have retaliated against Russia with a number of sanctions since the war began. On the other hand, Russia’s traditional allies in the East have been conspicuously silent in their condemnation of its actions in Ukraine. This misalignment on the geopolitical front has led the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) to decouple from the U.S.

We highlight a number of catalysts that may sustain this trend to reduce global reliance on the dollar. Our discussion attempts to steer clear of any political ideology and focuses solely on the likely economic impact of actual or potential policy actions.

Preserving Monetary Sovereignty

The mere premise of trading a country’s basic goods and services in a foreign currency presents a certain level of risk to that country’s monetary sovereignty. The domestic economy now becomes more vulnerable to currency and inflation shocks as well as foreign monetary policy. This proved to be particularly true for Russia whose commodity exports are largely dollarized.

As the BRICS bloc increases its global impact and ramps up its strategic rivalry with the West, it is mindful of the need, and opportunities, to become more independent in an increasingly multipolar world.

Security of Currency Reserves

The immediate and punitive sanctions on Russia also highlighted the reach and influence of Western institutions on emerging market economies.

As an example, the freezing of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves held abroad impaired its central bank’s ability to support the ruble, fight domestic inflation and provide liquidity to the private sector as external funding dried up. The actions of the U.S. and its Western allies were a reminder of how the dollar, and other currencies, can get politically weaponized.

Russia had already started its de-dollarization in 2014 after the Crimean invasion. Russia’s central bank has since cut its share of dollar-denominated reserves by more than half. It has also announced plans to eliminate all dollar-denominated assets from its sovereign wealth fund.

Shifts in Trade Invoicing

The efforts to de-dollarize have been most intense in this area. China has been a key force behind this trend, especially after the onset of its trade war with the U.S. in 2018. In a major threat to petrodollar hegemony, China is currently negotiating with Saudi Arabia to settle oil trades in Chinese yuan. On a recent state visit to China, French President Macron announced yuan-denominated bilateral trade in shipbuilding and liquefied natural gas.

Russia has also been active in shifting away from the use of dollars in foreign trade. It has steadily reduced its share of dollar settlements from 80% to 50% in the last ten years. India has been paying for deeply discounted Russian oil with Indian rupees for several months. India has also announced bilateral arrangements with several countries like Malaysia and Tanzania to settle trades in rupees. And in an unusual development, Pakistan recently paid for cheap Russian oil in Chinese yuan.

A desire on the part of the BRICS bloc to further extend membership to Iran and Saudi Arabia later in 2023 is another sign of petrodollar diversification and divestment.

Alternate Payment Systems

The lifeblood of international finance is its payment system. The gold standard for international money and security transfers is the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT). SWIFT does not actually move funds; it is instead a secure messaging system that allows banks to communicate quickly, efficiently and cheaply. China and Russia are now building international payment systems that can actually clear and settle cross-border transactions in their currencies.

These new trends will play a meaningful role in the eventual increased polarity of the currency world.

Reserve Currency Alternatives

We have already highlighted strong economic growth and institutional governance as important factors for ascendancy in global currency markets. The dollar has benefitted from those attributes among others for several decades now.

As the chatter on de-dollarization picks up, we take a quick look at how viable other currencies are to replace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. We examine the current mix of global currency reserves to identify some candidates.

Figure 1 shows the composition of central bank reserves over time. Even with the steady decline in the dollar’s share this century, it is still almost three times as large as the second-largest currency in foreign exchange reserves.

Figure 1 - MI Q3

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) COFER. As of Q1 2023, share is % of allocated reserves

The euro is the second largest currency within global central bank reserves with a share of around 20%. The share of other currencies tapers off rapidly thereafter with the Japanese yen and the British pound at 5% apiece and the Chinese yuan at 3%.

The broad-based malaise in their local economies and markets work against both the U.K. and Japan. The U.K. is adrift and directionless post-Brexit, and the pound has been in a steady decline for many years. The Japanese economy has been in the doldrums for several years now. The Japanese stock market peaked more than 30 years ago, and the Japanese yen is heavily influenced by the Bank of Japan. We rule out the pound and the yen as viable alternatives to the dollar.

This leaves us with three potential alternatives for the next reserve currency of the world.

  • Euro
  • Chinese yuan
  • Basket of multiple currencies

We defer a discussion on central bank digital currencies to a later date based on their sheer nascence and lack of practicality. We also exclude monetary gold, which is not part of the foreign exchange reserves reported by the IMF.

Euro

The euro is the official currency of 20 out of the 27 members of the European Union. This currency union is commonly referred to as the Eurozone. The euro has a number of advantages that make it a viable contender for a more prominent role in the global currency market.

The Eurozone is one of the largest economic blocs in the world. It is also a major player in global trade. The euro is the second-largest currency today within each of the categories of global reserves, foreign exchange transactions and global debt outstanding. It is easily convertible and is supported by generally sound macroeconomic policies.

However, we highlight a couple of key disadvantages that may impede its rise to the status of the world’s reserve currency.

Fragmentation Risks – While the Eurozone has successfully maintained its currency union for more than 20 years, it still remains fragmented in a couple of key areas. The Eurozone does not have a common sovereign bond market and also lacks fiscal integration within the region. This heterogeneity disadvantages the euro in ways that simply do not affect the dollar; the stability of the dollar is reliant on one single central bank and one single central government.

We illustrate this with a simple example. The divergence in bond yields and national fiscal policies was at the heart of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis around 2010. Several countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain were unable to repay or refinance their own government debt or help their own troubled banks. The bailout from other Eurozone countries required a level of fiscal austerity in terms of spending limits that proved politically challenging to implement. The euro came under considerable selling pressure at that time, which also saw a decline in its share of global foreign exchange reserves.

Lack of Political Diversification – The Eurozone is politically aligned with the U.S. on many geopolitical topics. Their unity came to the fore again during the imposition of Russian sanctions. If the main impetus to de-dollarize comes from the goal of political diversification in reserve holdings, the euro is not much of a substitute to the dollar in that regard.

Chinese Yuan

China has the second largest economy in the world and is invariably one of the top trading partners for many countries. In light of this, it may seem surprising that the yuan’s share of global trade invoicing is low at around 5%, and its share of global currency reserves is even smaller at around 3%.

While the Chinese yuan may aspire to play a bigger role in world currency markets, there are a number of hurdles that it may be unable or unwilling to overcome.

Lack of Convertibility and Liquidity – The Chinese yuan is not freely traded; it is pegged to the dollar and cannot be easily converted into other currencies or foreign assets.

Capital Controls – China imposes restrictions on the outflow of both capital and currency. It does so to limit the drawdown of its foreign exchange reserves and to keep the value of the yuan stable.

There has been a stark divergence between global and Chinese monetary policies in recent months. Global central banks have tightened aggressively to fight inflation; China has been reluctant to do so to protect its still-fragile, post-Covid recovery. This divergence in rates has exerted downward pressure on the yuan. China does not wish to deplete its foreign currency reserves by buying yuan. It also doesn’t want to see the yuan weaken further. Capital controls are the only way for it to achieve both goals.

Inherent Incompatibility – China enjoys a significant cost and competitive advantage in global markets through a relatively weak currency. The more it exports, the greater its incentive to limit currency appreciation. If the yuan succeeds in becoming the world’s reserve currency, the resulting demand for yuan will cause it to appreciate. In a perverse feedback loop, a stronger yuan will make China less competitive in global markets. This inherent incompatibility creates a strong disincentive for the yuan to overtake the dollar.

Basket of Currencies

It has also been proposed that a basket of currencies be designated to fulfill the role of a reserve currency. Any combination of currencies will have similar fragmentation risks to those listed above for the euro. In addition, hedging costs will be higher for a reserve currency basket because of asset-liability mismatches and liquidity differentials across constituent currencies.

A G-7 basket of currencies with high political solidarity will suffer from the same limitations in terms of lack of political diversification. On the other hand, a BRICS or any other Emerging Markets (EM) reserve currency basket will suffer from familiar issues of misalignment of common interests, lack of market depth, risk of political intervention and inherent incompatibility in balancing export competitiveness with currency strength.

We are, however, intrigued by the growing role of smaller currencies such as the Australian and Canadian dollars, the Swedish krona and the South Korean won within central bank reserves. In fact, these currencies account for more than two-thirds of the shift away from the U.S. dollar in recent years. We expect that their virtues of higher returns, lower volatility and fin-tech innovation will help them further increase their share in global reserves.

We come full circle and close out our discussion by highlighting the numerous advantages of the U.S. dollar in the global currency markets.

Fundamental Dollar Advantages

Even as its hegemony diminishes at the margin, we believe that the dollar will remain the world’s reserve currency for several decades. Our optimism is based on both the limitations of competing alternatives and the significant fundamental advantages of the dollar.

It is actually remarkable that the dollar has remained steady even in the face of lower demand from a declining share of foreign exchange reserves. We see this divergence in Figure 2.

Source: IMF COFER. As of Q1 2023, share is % of allocated reserves, dollar price is for DXY trade-weighted dollar

The green line in Figure 2 represents the price stability of the dollar even as its share of reserves fell from 1999 to 2022.

We turn to basic currency fundamentals to explain this steady historical performance and also to argue in favor of the dollar going forward. In the long term, currency performance is determined by differentials in inflation, economic growth, real income and productivity gains. The U.S. offers significant advantages on these and many other fronts.

  • Strong economic growth and incomes driven by sound macroeconomic policies
  • Low inflation from independent and credible monetary policy
  • Technological innovation that contributes to both productivity growth and disinflation
  • High domestic consumption which reduces reliance on trade and currency effects
  • Convertibility, stability and liquidity of the dollar
  • Deep and liquid bond market
  • Fundamental attractiveness of U.S. risk assets such as stocks, real estate and private investments
  • Well-regulated capital markets
  • Government and institutional adherence to the rule of law
  • Strong and credible military presence

We do not see a credible threat to the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency in the foreseeable future.

Summary

We expect dollar hegemony to be preserved, and only modestly diminished, over the next several years. The following trends summarize our outlook for the composition of central bank reserves and the currency markets overall.

a. The dollar’s share of world reserves will continue to decline gradually but still remain above 50%.

b. The share of the euro, Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Swedish krona, Swiss franc and South Korean won will inch higher.

c. The share of the Chinese yuan and other BRICS / EM currencies will rise less than what is currently expected.

We chose to focus exclusively on the current dedollarization debate in this quarter’s publication. At the same time, we are well aware of the deeply divided views on inflation, recession and the stock and bond markets. We are also closely watching the progression of any credit crunch from the March banking crisis.

In the brief space here at the end, we will simply observe that we are more constructive on the economy and markets than the worst-case scenarios. Our pro-growth positioning in portfolios has paid off handsomely so far in 2023. We remain careful and vigilant during these uncertain times.

The main impetus for de-dollarization in recent months stems from a rise in geopolitical tensions. 

 

We expect dollar hegemony to be preserved, and only modestly diminished, for the next several years.

 

Our optimism is based on both the limitations of competing alternatives and the fundamental advantages of the dollar.

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A Bump in the Road?

2023 began on a positive note. Prospects of a resilient economy and moderating inflation raised hopes for a soft landing and propelled stocks higher. Consumer spending was robust and GDP growth seemed to be in line with levels seen in a normal economy.

But much like the experience of the last several months, investor sentiment continued to fluctuate between extremes of optimism and pessimism. An exceptionally strong jobs report for January re-ignited fears that the economy may be running too hot for the Fed to pause. Bond yields rose sharply in February and stocks sold off as investors expected the Fed to continue tightening.

As eventful as the bear market has been so far, one of its momentous milestones took place in early March. It has been long feared that the rapid pace of monetary tightening would eventually lead to a financial accident and a subsequent crisis. Those fears came true as two regional banks, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank (SB), collapsed on March 10 and 12, respectively.

Bank failures are rare and they are almost unheard of outside of recessions. SVB and SB became the two largest banks to fail since the Global Financial Crisis. Their demise was swift as they unraveled in just a few business days. Fears of contagion spread across the globe and eventually claimed Credit Suisse a week later on March 19 as it was bought by UBS with assistance from the Swiss government.

We examine the short and long term implications of recent developments in our analysis.

At this stage, the banking crisis appears to be more of a bump in the road rather than a crippling pothole or crater.

Background

Let’s take a look at the macroeconomic backdrop that led to this recent bank crisis.

The massive stimulus put in place to fight off the pandemic led to a significant growth in bank deposits and loans. The large regional banks were at the forefront of this surge in loan growth. While their share of the total U.S. loan book was less than 20% in 2019, they accounted for almost 40% of subsequent loan growth. Deposits also grew more rapidly in comparison to their normal pre-Covid levels.

This rapid increase in bank balance sheets came about in an era of easy money and abundant liquidity. As we all know now, those factors also caused a sharp spike in inflation and abruptly triggered the most rapid monetary tightening cycle ever.

Regional banks are less regulated than the systemically important large banks. Their governance oversight, risk management practices and capital resilience eventually proved inadequate to withstand the dramatic rise in interest rates and the unprecedented speed of a run on deposits.

Here is a look at how this banking crisis may be different from previous ones and some of its short and long term implications.

Comparisons to 2008

How does the current banking crisis compare to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008? Will the events of March unleash a tidal wave of losses and bankruptcies and a deep global recession?

At this point, we do not believe that the current banking crisis will be nearly as severe or protracted as the GFC. Our optimism is based largely on the different origin of this crisis and the swift policy response that has limited its contagion so far.

Different Causes and Scope

Virtually all banking crises in the past can be traced to large loan losses stemming from bad credit. These losses typically arise from aggressive lending and poor underwriting. Borrowers turn out to be less creditworthy than believed and become progressively weaker as the crisis unfolds.

The transmission of a banking crisis into the broad economy follows a typical playbook. Loan losses diminish bank capital and inhibit the ability to lend in the future. The decline in loan growth then slows consumer spending and capital investments. The intensity and duration of this contagion eventually drives the depth of the ensuing recession.

However, the trigger for this banking crisis in March was not related to credit. It was instead a duration effect related to the rapid rise in interest rates. We know the basic bank business model is to borrow short and lend long. Bank deposits are short-term liabilities and bank loans are long-term assets. Bank balance sheets have an intrinsic duration mismatch where assets are more sensitive to interest rates than liabilities.

The rapid rise in interest rates triggered this duration risk and created unrealized losses in the long term bonds and loans within bank portfolios. The same rapid rise in rates also made money market funds at non-banks more attractive than bank deposits. Even as bank deposits were declining in a flight to money market funds, regional banks became vulnerable to another unusual risk.

Bank deposits are insured by the FDIC up to $250,000. Regional banks generally work more closely with small businesses. With a corporate clientele that typically maintains large balances, regional banks ended up with a high proportion of uninsured deposits in excess of $250,000.

Silicon Valley Bank catered predominantly to the venture capital community within its geographic reach. Given its client base, SVB ended up with one of the highest proportions of uninsured deposits among all banks at over 90%.

The decline of bank deposits at SVB was initially driven by the liquidity needs of its clientele as venture capital funding dried up. As SVB sold off assets and incurred losses to offset the initial decline in deposits, things quickly snowballed out of control as depositors feared for the safety of their remaining uninsured deposits.

In a brave new world of digital banking and social media, depositors pulled out a record $42 billion in deposits in one single day on March 9.

In an unprecedented bank run in terms of speed, SVB collapsed in two business days.

Unlike prior banking crises, this one was triggered by the unique confluence of a concentrated customer base in one single industry and geography, inadequate liquidity provisions and a lack of proactive regulatory oversight.

While a credit crunch may yet develop in the coming months, this banking crisis so far is different in that it has not seen large credit losses from defaults or bankruptcies. The SVB failure was not credit-driven, but rather a classic run on the bank created by a crisis of confidence and the ease of digital banking.

And finally, a quick word on the likely scope of this crisis in the coming months. This banking crisis is likely to be far less severe and systemic than the GFC because of one key difference – the health of the U.S. consumer.

The consumer, who drives 70% of the U.S. economy, is far more resilient today than was the case in 2008. The consumer balance sheet is healthy with no signs of excessive leverage. In a still-strong jobs market, consumer incomes are robust. While showing welcome signs of slowing down from an inflation point of view, consumer spending is still solid.

Timely Policy Response

The potential contagion from the failures of SVB and SB in one single weekend was controlled when the U.S. government announced that it would backstop all deposits at the two failed banks. In a similar vein, global contagion was contained the following weekend as the Swiss government intervened to prevent a potential chaotic failure of Credit Suisse.

The Fed also stepped up its liquidity provisions in the wake of the SVB and SB failures. The Fed’s Discount Window borrowing shot past $150 billion in the week ending March 15. The Fed also opened up a Bank Term Funding Program to offer loans of up to one year to depository institutions pledging qualified assets as collateral.

The Fed’s actions have caused its balance sheet to expand in recent weeks as shown in Figure 1.

Source: Federal Reserve

The Fed balance sheet grew to almost $9 trillion in 2022 and had fallen to a low of $8.3 trillion on March 8. The liquidity provisions to mitigate the March banking crisis saw its balance sheet grow again by more than $400 billion.

We believe that the Fed will further expand its balance sheet as needed to ward off a larger scale banking crisis. The additional liquidity will be aimed at stabilization as opposed to an intentional and stimulative increase of the money supply. These funds will help banks preserve or replenish bank capital. They are less likely to be deployed into the real economy in the form of new loans and add to the velocity of money through the multiplier effect.

Banks and Commercial Real Estate

One of the biggest concerns about the current banking situation is the refinancing of commercial real estate (CRE) debt in the near term. The fear of defaults and more bank losses is especially acute for the office segment as excess supply overwhelms lower demand in the new era of remote work.

We know that commercial real estate will be hampered by the higher cost of refinancing as rates have gone higher. We focus on the risks for the sector from the lack of availability of capital, not just the higher cost of capital.

Here are some salient details of the commercial real estate debt market.

  • Total commercial real estate debt is around $4.5 trillion
  • 38% of this debt is held by banks and thrifts
  • However, all commercial real estate debt makes up only 12% of total bank domestic loans

The commercial real estate debt coming due in the next 3 years is almost $1.5 trillion. The office debt maturing in the next 3 years is 12% of that amount or about $180 billion. We observe that both the low share of office debt as a % of total CRE debt and the low share of total CRE debt as a % of all bank loans may limit the impact of office debt defaults more than investors currently fear.

We also point to a more subtle positive observation in the composition of office loans maturing in 2023 and 2024. This is shown in Figure 2.

Source: RCA, Cushman & Wakefield Research

Each bar in Figure 2 breaks down office loans maturing in any given year by the original term loan.It tells us how many of the loans maturing in any year were originated recently (in the last 3 years) and how many loans are more seasoned (over 5 years old).

Let’s take a closer look at just the shaded box in Figure 2 above which highlights office loans maturing in 2023 and 2024. We can see here that most of these maturing loans are seasoned with an original loan term of 5 years or longer.

We believe the original term of loans maturing in the next two years is relevant for the following reason. From the time that these more seasoned loans were originated, the underlying properties had a greater chance to appreciate in value before the onset of higher interest rates. This accrued value appreciation will make refinancing easier even if bank lending standards tighten and loan-to-value ratios come down.

By the same token, the loans most at risk of default would be those that originated recently in the last 3 years. These properties have likely lost value both from non-performance and higher cap rates. On a positive note, they make up a smaller percentage of all office loans maturing in 2023 and 2024.

The cascading impact of the rise in interest rates so far will play out in the commercial real estate market over several months. A likely pause in the Fed tightening cycle will provide welcome relief for all segments of the real estate market.

At this point, we do not see a dire debt crisis stemming from commercial real estate.

Secular Implications

It is inevitable that the end of easy money and the banking crisis of 2023 will leave us with long-term shifts in bank regulations and business models. Here are some quick thoughts on secular changes in regulatory oversight, profitability and valuations.

It is quite likely that we will see greater regulation of regional banks with at least $100 billion in assets. The key lesson from SVB is how to incorporate unrealized losses in banks’ securities portfolios into regulatory capital.

It would also make sense to apply “enhanced prudential standards” to regional banks with assets of more than $100 billion. These standards will subject smaller banks to new stress tests and liquidity rules. We expect bank oversight and scrutiny will become more stringent to assess funding sources and concentration risks. Regulators may also act to deter a run on deposits with additional protection at a greater cost to the banking sector.

The greater burden of regulatory oversight and compliance is likely to bring down profitability and valuations for most financial institutions. The ones who can fundamentally restructure and organize their business models around specific customer needs may be able to avoid this adverse fate.

Economic Impact

Let’s take a step back to see how this micro banking crisis fits into the bigger macro picture for the economy and markets. In that context, it is helpful to recap the latest trends in inflation, jobs and overall growth.

Even as headline inflation continues to decline at a meaningful clip, core inflation has remained largely unchanged in recent months. Unlike the skeptics on this front, we expect shelter costs and wages to also decline gradually in the coming months.

Job growth has slowed down in recent months but still remains healthy with more than 200,000 new jobs created in March. Other metrics of economic activity continue to show a gradual deceleration. We see evidence of an orderly economic slowdown, but no signs of a precipitous and chaotic fall into a deep recession.

At the time of this writing, the contagion from the regional bank crisis in March to the broader U.S. economy seems to be contained. The recent bank failures will likely slow credit growth through tighter lending standards in the coming months. At the margin, this will further slow economic growth.

On the other hand, the “tightening” from slower loan growth will help the Fed pause sooner and pivot to rate cuts earlier than expected. We believe these two effects will offset one another and may well rule out significant changes in the economic outlook.

At this early stage, we do not expect the banking crisis to materially add to the depth of any impending recession.

Summary

The risks which triggered the recent bank failures were unusual and different than those seen in previous crises. We summarize our key takeaways and insights on the topic as follows.

  • The current bank crisis arose from duration and liquidity risks which were triggered by a historically rapid run on deposits, not from the more adverse risk of negative credit exposure.
  • Timely policy responses have so far contained the regional bank crisis without any material side effects.
  • We believe bank regulators and the Fed also have enough policy flexibility going forward to stave off a major systemic shock to the U.S. economy.
  • The disinflationary effects of slower loan growth may help the Fed pause and pivot sooner than expected.
  • We believe that any potential recession will likely remain short and shallow.

As uncertain as the last few years have been, the events from March add a new dimension of risk to the economic and market outlook. We are even more vigilant, careful and prudent in managing portfolios during these volatile times.

Timely policy responses have so far contained the regional bank crisis.

 

At this stage, the banking crisis appears to be more of a bump in the road rather than a crippling pothole or crater.

 

The disinflationary effects of slower loan growth may help the Fed pause and pivot sooner than expected.

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Focus on Recession ... or Recovery?

The market turmoil of 2022 couldn’t have been in sharper contrast to the benign conditions of low inflation, easy money and high growth seen in 2021. Persistently high inflation in recent months has led to tighter monetary policy and slower growth.

The Fed has raised rates by more than 400 basis points and reduced its balance sheet by almost $400 billion ... with more to come on both fronts. Inflationary pressures have come from both pent-up demand and supply side shocks. The war in Ukraine has lasted longer than most expected and China’s zero-Covid policy further disrupted supply chain logistics.

These factors conspired to push back the peak in inflation and created a hostile environment for risk assets. Investors were left with no place to hide ... even bonds did not provide a safe haven in 2022.

Very rarely do both stocks and bonds deliver negative returns in a single year. Over the last almost 100 years, this has only happened twice and 2022 was by far the worst outcome in this regard. Stocks were down almost -20% and bonds were down around -10%.

All of this brings us to an interesting juncture in this bear market. The calls for a recession in 2023 have become virtually universal in recent weeks. The arguments in favor of that view appear well-justified. Growth is clearly slowing, the housing market is falling under the weight of rising rates, the entire yield curve is now inverted, the Fed is far removed from rate cuts and the global economy is in even more dire straits.

These macroeconomic views in turn support the characterization that the current stock market rebound is just another bear market rally. The consensus believes that this rally will only flatter to deceive and stocks are then inevitably headed to new lows. The skeptics further observe that stocks have never bottomed before the onset of a recession and worry specifically about three potentially negative outcomes.

  • Services inflation may yet prove to be uncomfortably sticky.
  • The Fed may have virtually no flexibility in its policy path forward.
  • Earnings, and stock valuations as a result, may continue to slide lower.

We address these concerns specifically in developing our more contrarian and constructive outlook for 2023.

Trends in Components of Inflation

Inflation was clearly the headline story in 2022. But as headline inflation peaks, investors are now switching their focus to economic growth as well.

While the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge is based on Personal Consumption Expenditures, we use the more comprehensive Consumer Price Index (CPI) for ease of discussion here.

Headline CPI inflation peaked at 9.1% in June and has since declined to 6.5% in December. However, core CPI inflation, which excludes the volatile food and energy components, seems to be uncomfortably stuck at an elevated level. Core CPI inflation was 5.7% in December and has been largely unchanged in a narrow band around 6% for several months.

Investors now worry that core inflation will remain stubborn, sticky and elevated for quite a while.

Let’s decompose inflation into its goods and services components and study their underlying trends. Much like the overall U.S. economy, inflation is also more dominated by services than it is by goods.

It turns out that goods inflation has actually declined rapidly in recent months. Supply chain pressures have eased significantly, gasoline prices have fallen sharply and the price of almost all commodities from wheat to lumber has declined dramatically. Unfortunately, since goods are a smaller component of inflation, they have played a smaller role in bringing inflation down.

Services inflation is made up mainly of two components – rents and wages. Both are notorious for being sticky. We look at each of them separately.

The dark blue line in Figure 1 shows CPI shelter inflation, which has been rising steadily for several months and now stands at 7.5%.

       Source: Federal Reserve, Zillow, Apartment List

At first glance, this increase in shelter inflation contradicts the growing weakness in the housing market. But the counter-trend is actually not much of a surprise at all.

Rents are typically negotiated over a 12-month lease. It, therefore, takes 12 months for the entire stock of leases to get re-priced. Even as rents on new leases begin to come down, older leases at previously higher rents slow down the measured decline in rents. This lagged measurement effect does not capture real-time fundamentals because of the delayed discovery of new rent prices.

The good news in Figure 1 is that rents on new leases are indeed coming down. We can see that clearly in the two downward parabolas. Both these lines show rents for new listings and offer a more timely indicator of rent inflation. Rent growth on new leases is declining rapidly. The Dallas Fed projects that rent inflation will likely peak in the second quarter, which means that rent relief is in sight.

Let’s see if wage inflation is also likely to abate by using average hourly earnings as our proxy for wages. The year-over-year change in average hourly earnings was 4.7% in December. This is clearly too high to achieve the Fed’s target of 2% inflation overall.

But again, recent data brings some good news. Wage inflation peaked over a year ago and has since been declining. At its peak, wage inflation was above 6%. In contrast, the annualized pace of wage gains in the fourth quarter of 2022 was less than 4%.

We believe wage inflation will continue to trend lower as the job market begins to cool off. But how far can wage inflation decline? Can it go back to pre-pandemic levels?

Unfortunately, we believe the answer is No, not quite. We believe two reasons may drive a secular uptick in wages – one related to demographics and the other to the pandemic.

As we know, the labor force participation rate is the proportion of the working-age population that is either working or actively looking for work. It represents the available resources for the production of goods and services. An aging population has been a major driver of labor shortages in recent years. As the baby boomers age, the labor force participation rate has been declining for the last 20 years.

We show this demographic trend in Figure 2.

Source: Haver, Jeffries Economics

The labor force participation rate is shown as the dark green line and its trendline is in light green.

The steadily declining labor force participation rate trendline will continue to constrain labor resources. As a result, even as wage inflation comes down, it is unlikely to subside to pre-pandemic levels.

And beyond demographics, there is another factor at play here related to the pandemic.

It turns out that we have more than 2 million fewer workers today than we did prior to Covid. Interestingly, the largest cohort of these missing workers, almost 1 million of them, is in the age group of 65 and above. We can only surmise that these workers embraced full retirement over the vagaries of a Covid-ravaged workplace. They are unlikely to re-enter the labor force.

This pandemic effect is incrementally additive to the broad demographic trend. Absent any major policy reform on immigration, we believe that both wages and overall inflation will eventually settle in at a slightly higher level in the next cycle.

Inflation averaged about 3% between the 1970s and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We believe that the abnormally low 2% post-GFC inflation was enabled by a long deleveraging cycle and is unrealistic in this post-covid recovery.

We believe inflation will be less sticky than feared and will continue to decline in coming months. However, we feel it will eventually settle in above the Fed’s target of 2% ... somewhere in the 2.5% to 3% range. We also believe that this slightly higher range of inflation will still be benign to stock and bond valuations.

Flexibility of The Fed

The U.S. job market was remarkably strong in 2022 and, as a result, the U.S. consumer was remarkably resilient. However, cracks are beginning to emerge in both the labor market and the overall economy. Layoffs and job losses are mounting, retail sales are falling and economic activity as measured by the Purchasing Managers Index and Leading Economic Indicators is beginning to drop off materially.

The growing evidence of a slowing economy and cooling inflation gives the Fed more flexibility on policy.

As of mid-January, the Fed expects 3 more rate hikes of 25 bps each for a terminal Fed funds rate of 5.1%. It then expects to hold rates steady for the rest of the year. The market, on the other hand, expects only 2 more rate hikes, not 3.

And more importantly, it expects 2 rate cuts in November and December.

Should the Fed pause and pivot sooner than they anticipate? The market believes they should ... and so do we.

To the extent that this upcoming recession will be induced by Fed tightening, we believe that the Fed will also have the flexibility to mitigate it before it becomes entrenched.

2023 will offer up a set of binary outcomes. In one scenario, growth slows all the way into a recession. In this setting, inflation comes down and the Fed no longer needs to be restrictive because the inflation war has been won. If inflation instead doesn’t subside, it will likely be on the heels of a fairly strong economy in which case a recession becomes moot.

We, therefore, believe that any potential recession will be short and shallow.

We assign a low probability to the two scenarios that work against our view – high inflation in the midst of a recession or a Fed mistake wherein they remain restrictive for several months into a recession.

Earnings and Stock Valuations

Earnings estimates for 2023 have been declining steadily in the last few months. Despite this downtrend, earnings in 2023 are still projected to grow modestly. Investors worry that these earnings projections are unrealistically high.

Many fear that earnings may fall by levels that have historically been seen during prior recessions. In the four recessionary years of this century (2001, 2008, 2009 and 2020), earnings fell by an average of -15%. A similar decline in 2023 could push stocks to significant new lows.

We offer two counter perspectives.

We agree with the view that earnings are at risk and are more likely to decline from here. But we don’t expect any impending recession to be similar to the GFC or the Covid recessions in terms of its impact on earnings. We believe the upcoming “earnings recession” will also be short and shallow.

Our second observation should further allay concerns about negative earnings growth in general. Conventional wisdom suggests that price generally follows earnings. If earnings go up, price goes up; if earnings go down, price goes down.

But, counter to intuition and popular belief, it is actually possible for stocks to go up when earnings go down! Indeed, they do so more often than not.

We show this interesting anomaly in Figure 3.

          Source: Bloomberg, Evercore ISI Research

We show S&P 500 returns on the y-axis and earnings growth on the x-axis.

There have been 13 instances in the last 50 years when earnings have declined in a calendar year. Stocks were down in only 3 of those 13 years. These limited instances, which include 2008 and 2001, can be seen in the bottom left quadrant of negative earnings, negative returns.

However, in defiance of convention and heuristics, stocks actually go up about 70% of the time when earnings are down. We see that in the top left quadrant of negative earnings, positive returns.

On further reflection, this stock market outcome is not all that surprising. We know that the core function of the stock market is to anticipate and discount future events. It is always looking ahead and often by almost a year.

At pivot points in the economy when a recession might transition to a recovery, stocks can become disconnected from the current reality of weakness and get connected to a new future reality of strength.

We demonstrate this discounting mechanism both visually and empirically in Figure 4.

Source: Bloomberg, Evercore ISI Research

Figure 4 plots three S&P 500 variables – prices, price-to-earnings multiples and aggregate earnings. It traces the trajectory for Price (P), Price/Earnings (PE) and Earnings (E) during recessionary bear markets.

Time t = 0 coincides with the low point of the bear market seen during a recession. P, PE and E are all indexed to 100 at t = 0. All data points to the left of t = 0 are prior to the market bottom. All observations to the right of t = 0 are after the market has bottomed out.

In this framework, the trajectory for P is hardly surprising. Prices decline before they hit bottom and then rise thereafter. This V-shape trajectory for P is merely a truism. Stock valuations or PE follow a similar trajectory. The trough in P and PE is marked by a red circle.

Now here is the interesting observation from Figure 4. The solid black line traces the trajectory for Earnings (E) during a recession. As expected, earnings decline as the recession unfolds. E eventually bottoms out as marked by the red oval, but it does so well after P and PE have bottomed out.

So here is the answer to the seemingly confounding earnings conundrum. The trough in prices and P/E multiples leads the trough in earnings. Stock prices anticipate the eventual low point of earnings well before it happens.

How far in advance do stocks bottom out before earnings do? The readings on the x-axis suggest that this lead time can be around a year or so.

If the earnings recession of 2023 ends up being short and shallow as we expect, it is conceivable that the October 2022 low in S&P 500 price and P/E multiple was in anticipation of trough earnings in 2023.

If that were the case, then we could be in the zone between the red circle and red oval in Figure 4 where stock prices and valuations go up even as earnings go down.

We assign a lower probability to a deep economic or earnings recession than the consensus. We believe the market may well have priced any remaining economic or earnings weakness for 2023 through its discounting mechanism.

Summary

Bear markets, especially ones that are accompanied by a recession, can be long, painful and a true litmus test of patience and endurance. So here is our economic and market outlook for 2023 and beyond to help investors navigate the second year of this difficult bear market. We believe:

  • Services inflation will be less sticky than feared and gradually abate
    • Rent inflation will decline in the coming months as lagged effects roll over
    • Wage inflation will subside but not all the way down to its pre-Covid levels
  • Overall inflation will likely normalize at 2.5% – 3.0% in 18 to 24 months
  • A slowing economy and cooling inflation will give the Fed more flexibility than it anticipates
  • Greater Fed flexibility will prevent any potential recession from becoming deep and protracted
  • The earnings recession will also be short and shallow, in line with a potential economic recession
  • Stock prices and price/earnings multiples may have bottomed ahead of the trough in earnings
  • Stocks may be impervious to further declines in earnings
  • Stocks and bonds will deliver a decent equity risk premium and term premium
  • Bonds will provide better diversification than they have in the past

In the midst of high uncertainty, we remain vigilant but also cautiously optimistic. We continue to emphasize portfolio diversification, risk management and high quality investments.

Services inflation may be less sticky than feared and gradually abate.

 

A slowing economy and cooling inflation may give the Fed more flexibility than it anticipates.

 

Stock prices and price/earnings multiples generally bottom well ahead of the trough in earnings.

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With the 2021 tax filings behind us and the 2022 tax year drawing to a close, it’s already time for tax updates coming in 2023. The IRS released its 2023 tax year annual inflation adjustments covering updates to more than 60 tax provisions. The 2023 tax year adjustments will effect tax returns filed in 2024. For 2022 tax year filings due in 2023, certain tax due dates fall on a weekend. The actual due date is the following Monday. A list of 2023 federal tax due dates can be found in the attached PDF.

 

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The 2022 holiday spending forecast and why this year will be different than last

It’s that time of year when Americans are making their lists and checking them twice, but for the 2022 holiday season, many will be slimming down their spending. “I don't think there's any question that holiday spending will be slower this year,” says Whittier Trust Senior Vice President and Senior Portfolio Manager Teague Sanders, a phenomenon that will impact every socio economic segment. Here are some of the reasons why we’re likely to see a chilling effect on holiday spending for the 2022 season. 

Most consumers have already made their sizeable pandemic purchases 

Late 2020 and 2021 were big years for consumers making durable goods purchases such as new washers, dryers and other appliances, as well as automobiles. “These one-time, large expenses have all mostly been bought,” Sanders explains. “Once you’ve made such a purchase, you don’t have to buy it again anytime soon.” There was somewhat frenzied buying activity around these categories due to supply chain disruptions and the early part of the pandemic when many consumers were saving money thanks to stores being shut down. 

“That wealth effect has begun to diminish. We have also seen some slowdown in home prices, amid higher interest rates, higher borrowing costs and depletion of a lot of the excess savings that was sitting in people's bank accounts for the last 18 months,” Sanders says. “There’s simply less of an inclination, across all demographics, right now for people to go out and spend.” 

Luxury travel and goods might be somewhat exempt from the downturn

However, for the top echelon of income earners in the United States, some categories of holiday spending might be less impacted by lower spending. The pandemic era saw the introduction of a trend called “revenge travel”—essentially where consumers were taking their bucket list trips (often more than one) as a reaction to being cooped up at home for months on end. While this spending trend is slowing some, certain segments of the population are still booking high-end, luxury trips to faraway destinations. 

“Two areas that are proving to be more resilient are ultra-high-end luxury goods and airline prices,” Sanders says. “While portfolios of these consumers are down perhaps 18 to 20%, demand continues to remain robust owing to an increased wealth effect and supply demand imbalances respectively.” 

Plan to spend wisely 

No matter how much money you have, it pays to be wise with it. “Even when people have a larger pool of funds to pull from, they tend to still be rational in their purchasing decisions. They're just rational in slightly different ways,” Sanders says. When the vast majority of the country thinks about a large purchase, it might be a home appliance, but when ultra-high-net-worth individuals consider a sizable purchase, the scale is much larger. 

While most Whittier Trust clients have a strong understanding of how wealth works, advisors make it a point to keep an eye on every facet of their clients’ portfolios. “We’re not doing our job if we're not counseling people on the direction of borrowing costs and where expenses are likely to run,” says Sanders. With higher interest rates and increased costs of just about every good and service, everything is pricier in 2022. 

While those things may not immediately impact someone’s lifestyle, the Whittier team realizes that wealth is just one important facet of a person’s overall peace of mind, and it can be emotionally charged. “When we counsel people, we take their thoughts and emotions into account as we make our recommendations,” Sanders says. “That approach is really helpful because our clients see what's going on in the world around them. No matter how wealthy someone is, it’s important to be empathetic and realize that what’s going on in the world at large is impacting them too.” 

Practical implications for this holiday season and beyond

Some people might be thinking about whether the gifts they’ll receive this holiday season will change, but more broadly, decreased spending can have significant implications for markets overall. 

“Consumer spending is 60 to 70% of GDP growth in the United States, so consumer sentiment matters quite a bit,” says Sanders, who notes that recent Google Trends reports—a predictor of what’s on people’s minds—have seen a sharp increase in searches for the word “inflation.” Higher prices on everything from gas to groceries tends to dampen consumer spending. “It really impacts your emotional state because those sharp price hikes are disconcerting,” he explains. 

His advice? Take a deep breath and keep an eye on the long game you’ve agreed with your wealth management advisor. “Adjusting to the new normal is going to take a little bit of time, because there's been an entire generation of spenders who have really known nothing besides zero interest rates,” Sanders says. Markets are fluid by nature, and the right advisors and advocates can help you weather the storm.  

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Foreign Contagion Risks and the Policy Path 

The U.S. economy continues to show remarkable resilience in the face of stubbornly high inflation and tighter financial conditions. Core inflation, which is more influenced by the sticky components of rents and wages, remains elevated even as headline inflation recedes at a glacial pace. The Fed has already raised short rates from zero to 3% and remains steadfast in its commitment to more rate hikes.

The fallout from persistent inflation and a hawkish Fed has led to several adverse outcomes. The U.S. dollar and long-term bond yields continue to soar higher. And stock prices continue their downward trajectory as they discount rising risks of a global recession.

Despite the Fed’s efforts to cool the economy down, the jobs market remains surprisingly strong. The unemployment rate is still at its all-time low of 3.5% and weekly unemployment claims are close to historical lows. There are still 10 million job openings, which far exceed the available pool of 6 million unemployed workers.

Healthy job creation and steady wage gains have supported consumer incomes and spending. As a result, real GDP growth for the third quarter is projected to rebound from negative levels in the first two quarters to above +2%.

On the policy front, the Fed has repeatedly communicated that restoring price stability now is crucial for achieving sustainable growth and full employment in the long run. In this context, the Fed has made it abundantly clear that it is willing to accept “short-term pain for long-term gain”.

The current economic backdrop in the U.S. will likely encourage the Fed to continue tightening aggressively. After all, why worry about the possibility of breaking something in a big way or unleashing systemic risk from a financial crisis when we haven’t even slowed the economy materially?

With investor focus squarely on U.S. inflation and Fed policy, it may be worthwhile at this juncture to take a closer look at the broad global economic landscape. The U.S. has enjoyed strong growth fundamentals through both the Covid crisis and this latest inflation shock. The rest of the world has not been so fortunate. The inflation problem is significantly worse and growth is materially weaker outside the U.S.

In a still tightly integrated global economy, we examine the impact of U.S. policy actions on global growth. To what extent has the rapid pace of Fed tightening contributed to global economic stress?

At a more relevant level, we also assess the risks of contagion back to the U.S. from ailing foreign economies. We focus on two themes:

  • Can the U.S. remain an oasis in an increasingly barren global growth landscape and avoid cross-border contagion?
  • Can U.S. policy responses better mitigate global systemic risk and minimize contagion risks?

We look at recent developments in key foreign economies. We identify the strong dollar as a potential driver of future U.S. and global weakness. Finally, we offer some thoughts on the Fed’s optimal policy path forward within a broader global context.

Foreign Economic Risks

We begin our brief tour of foreign economies with a quick look at recent volatility in the U.K. bond market and its global fallout.

On September 23, the new administration in the U.K. announced a new fiscal plan to spur growth from supply-side reform and tax cuts. However, this focus on fiscal stimulus was at odds with restrictive monetary policy from the Bank of England and risked a further escalation of already-high inflation.

The lack of any funding details also raised concerns about an unsustainably higher debt burden and sent U.K. bond yields soaring. This upward spiral in bond yields was further exacerbated by forced liquidation of U.K. long-term bonds, also known as gilts, by local pension funds.

The unexpected rise in U.K. bond yields spread through the global bond and currency markets. This contagion is seen clearly in Figure 1.

Source: FactSet as of October 12, 2022

Immediately after the initial announcement, the 30-year U.K. gilt bond yield (shown in green) rose by more than 100 basis points to almost 5%. The spike in U.K bond yields reverberated across the globe. The 10-year U.S. bond yield (dark blue) moved higher by 50 basis points to almost 4% and the U.S. dollar strengthened against the British pound (light blue) by more than 5%. Higher bond yields and the strong dollar, in turn, sent U.S. stocks significantly lower at the end of September.

The rise in U.K. bond interest rates also highlighted another vulnerability for the global economy. As much as higher interest rates crowd out consumer spending in any economy, the problem is particularly severe in foreign economies.

The U.S. consumer is unique, and fortunate, in being able to access fixed rate long-term mortgages ranging in term from 15 to 30 years. For example, think about a U.S. household that refinanced its long-term mortgage during the period of low interest rates prior to 2022. With a low interest rate locked in for many years, that household is now immune to higher housing costs from rising mortgage rates.

Our readers may find it interesting to note that few mortgages overseas are at a fixed rate over long terms. Figure 2 provides a glimpse of how mortgages vary across countries by the term over which the interest rate is fixed.

Source: European Mortgage Federation

More than 90% of mortgages in the U.S. have a fixed rate over a long term in excess of 10 years. In Germany and Spain, that proportion drops to just around 50%. The impact of rising rates on housing costs is even worse in the U.K., where long-term fixed rate mortgages simply don’t exist.

More than 90% of mortgages in the U.K. offer a fixed rate for only 1-5 years. In a country already hit hard by high inflation, the greater proportion of mortgages resetting to a higher rate and higher payments significantly add to the odds of a U.K. recession.

The situation is also grim in Europe, but for a different set of reasons. Europe’s historical dependence on Russian energy is well known. Prior to the war with Ukraine, roughly 40% of Europe’s natural gas imports came from Russia. Since the invasion, Europe has looked for new sources of supply and Russia has retaliated by shutting off some of its existing supply of gas.

The resulting energy shortfall in Europe has led to sky-high energy prices, high inflation and significantly weaker growth. We show the outsized impact of energy costs on Eurozone inflation in Figure 3.

Source: European Central Bank

The nearly ten-fold increase in natural gas prices in Europe has led to a mega-spike in energy inflation and double-digit headline inflation in Europe. While energy inflation in the U.S. has started to decline, it shows no signs of abating in Europe. And things are likely to get worse during the dark winter months as Europe contemplates reduced energy consumption. Any cutbacks in production within energy-intensive sectors will likely lead to more layoffs and lower economic growth.

European policymakers are particularly hamstrung in balancing inflation and growth considerations at this point. The inflation problem in Europe emanates from a true supply shock, which cannot be remedied simply by raising interest rates. Any fiscal stimulus to counter lower industrial production and employment runs the risk of driving already-high inflation even higher.

Our baseline outcomes for Europe are listed below.

  • The European Central Bank is unlikely to hike rates as aggressively as the Fed.
  • A weak Euro will likely contribute to higher energy prices and more persistent headline inflation.
  • Europe may be forced to consider fiscal stimulus at some point to soften the recessionary hit.

Finally, we touch briefly on growth challenges in China. For a long time, China’s high growth trajectory was achieved by investment and trade. It has recently tried to shift growth more towards domestic consumption, but with limited success. China’s two key drivers of growth are now under significant pressure.

China’s investment share of GDP is almost twice the global average and has come at the expense of an unsustainable surge in debt. As an example, the heavily indebted real estate sector is now slowing dramatically. A zero-Covid policy has reduced mobility of people, goods and services, increased supply chain problems and decreased global trade. China’s trade and competitiveness have been further compromised by the new U.S. export controls on semiconductor chips and machinery.

We note in summary that foreign economies are far more fragile than the U.S. and remain quite vulnerable to policy missteps and exogenous shocks.

Pitfalls of a Strong Dollar

The U.S. economy is stronger than any foreign economy for a number of reasons. The recent monetary and fiscal stimulus in the U.S. was the largest in the world. As a result, the U.S. consumer is still resilient and its jobs market is still strong. U.S. inflation is, therefore, as much a demand issue as it is a supply-side shock.

As we have discussed above, this is not the case in the rest of the world. Foreign central banks are unable to raise rates aggressively because of weaker demand. Foreign inflation is also far less of a demand issue than it is a true supply-side shock.

This divergence between growth and policy dynamics in the U.S. and the rest of the world argues for continued dollar strength. We highlight two key risks from a persistently strong U.S. dollar.

First, a strong dollar reduces earnings for U.S. multinational companies from a simple currency translation effect. Revenues booked in foreign countries get translated back to lower dollar levels at a higher exchange rate. Figure 4 shows this intuitive strong-dollar / weak-earnings relationship.

Source: Bloomberg

The blue line in Figure 4 shows the year-over-year change in the U.S. dollar on an inverted scale on the right axis. A downward sloping line, therefore, denotes dollar strength. The green line shows the year-over-year growth in S&P 500 earnings estimates for the next twelve months (NTM) on the left axis.

We can clearly see here that S&P 500 earnings go down as the dollar goes up. A sustained rally in the U.S. dollar going forward could further reduce corporate profits and potentially trigger a dangerous self-reinforcing spiral of more layoffs, lower consumer spending, weaker economic growth, lower company revenues, back to lower profits … and so on.

And second, a strong dollar poses risks to foreign economies as well. A strong U.S. dollar raises the cost of their imports and drives up their inflation. Supply-side energy inflation is already high overseas; a strong dollar only makes this bad situation worse. Currency fluctuations affect trade balances and foreign exchange reserves. And emerging market economies find it increasingly difficult to service their dollar-denominated debt.

The strength of the U.S. dollar remains an important conduit for global contagion of economic weakness.

Possibilities for the Policy Path

The Fed has repeatedly reiterated its relentless pursuit of monetary tightening to quell inflation. It has so far been unmoved by the prospects of a U.S. or global recession.

We have recently suggested that the Fed may be well served from a shift in positioning where it becomes less rigid and more data-dependent. Our view is based on the observation that real-time U.S. inflation is likely coming down even as lagged measures of inflation such as shelter CPI continue to rise. We believe that the downward trajectory in upstream and coincident inflation will eventually bring overall inflation below policy rates.

Our focus on the fragility of foreign economies bolsters the argument for a more flexible approach to Fed policy. There is now an increasing chance that a central bank or government misstep is an accident waiting to happen. The calamitous fallout from the U.K. mini-budget crisis is just one small example.

We also believe that it is premature for the Fed to pause right now and a grave mistake for it to pivot towards rate cuts. We support the notion of continued rate hikes in 2022 to keep inflation expectations in check.

However, the Fed will likely have done enough and the U.S. and global economies will likely have weakened enough for the Fed to signal a pause in early 2023. A prescriptive upward march in U.S. policy rates in 2023 may very well lead to an unexpected and dire financial crisis somewhere in the world.

Summary

We are still in the midst of unprecedented economic and market uncertainty. U.S. core inflation remains sticky even as more timely measures of inflation appear to be declining in real time. Foreign inflation is less influenced by demand and largely remains a supply-side shock.

Against this backdrop, foreign economies are fragile and especially vulnerable to policy missteps. We believe that a pause in rate hikes by the Fed in 2023 will mitigate the risks of unexpected financial crises.

We continue to emphasize our strong regional preference for the U.S. over foreign markets. We also continue to target sufficient liquidity reserves to help our clients weather this storm. More so than ever, we remain vigilant and prudent in diversifying risk within client portfolios.

 

Foreign economies are fragile and remain vulnerable to policy missteps and exogenous shocks.

 

The strength of the U.S. dollar remains an important conduit for global contagion of economic weakness.

 

A pause in rate hikes by the Fed in 2023 will mitigate the risks of unexpected financial crises.

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The End of Easy Money

Introduction

The market turmoil in 2022 so far is in sharp contrast to the heady mix of stimulative policy and low volatility in 2021. In 2022, persistently high inflation has led to tighter monetary policy and slower growth.

The Fed has raised rates from 0 to 2.25%. It is on track to reduce its balance sheet ... perhaps by as much as $500 billion by December. Long term interest rates have moved dramatically in response to inflation and proposed Fed policy. Along the way, the war in Ukraine and lockdowns in China have further pushed back the potential peak in inflation.

These events have conspired to create a hostile market environment for risky assets. At their low point, stocks were down by more than -20% and bonds had declined by over -10%.

As a long cycle of easy money draws to an end, we discuss several implications of a more normalized regime of inflation, interest rates and valuations.

In the short term ...

  • Have we just seen that elusive peak in inflation or will the data “flatter to deceive”?
  • How far behind is the Fed in its tightening cycle and how far does it need to go from here?
  • Are we in a recession now? If not, when will it arrive and how long will it last?
  • How severe and protracted will the bear market be for stocks and other risky assets?

There are even more intriguing questions on the other side of this economic slowdown.

In the longer run ...

  • Where will inflation and interest rates eventually settle?
  • What will stock and bond returns look like?

These are extraordinary times of change, challenge and chaos. We hope these insights help our readers navigate this unusually high market volatility.

Inflation and The Fed

We know inflation has been rising steadily. It is now remarkably high, pervasive and ubiquitous. However, there are clear signs in recent weeks that inflation may have peaked in June.

Headline and core CPI inflation (Consumer Price Index) for July came in below the June highs and also below consensus expectations. The downside surprise to July inflation has now raised hopes that inflation may have started its descent from June’s lofty 9.1% perch.

It is still feared that wage inflation, which tends to be more sticky and stubborn, will be a key impediment to a swift reversal in inflation. For example, average hourly earnings grew by 5.2% in July on a year-over-year basis.

But a closer look at monthly changes in average hourly earnings others some hints of deceleration. In the last 6 months, average hourly earnings have increased at a slower pace of just around 4%. In contrast, wage gains in the prior twelve months were in the range of 5-6%.

A potential diminution in wage pressures is corroborated with a decline of over a million job openings in recent months and an increase in corporate layoffs.

As inflation and stagflation fears have given way to recession concerns in recent weeks, we have seen other compelling signs of disinflation and demand destruction.

  • Longer-term inflation expectations have come down dramatically. As an example, 5-year inflation expectations have fallen from a high of about 3.7% to around 2.6%.
  • Gasoline futures are off their highs by over 20%. And the average price of gas at the pump has declined steadily by over $1/gallon since mid-June.
  • The price of most commodities including copper, nickel, lumber, wheat and corn has also declined by more than 20% in recent weeks.
  • Supply chain pressures continue to decline even as demand seems to be getting weaker.

And finally, at the risk of re-igniting a controversial debate, our last argument in favor of subsiding future inflation comes from monetary theory instead of empirical evidence.

We have previously observed that the relationship between money supply growth and inflation seemed to have broken down after the 1980s. This was borne out by the data between 1990 and 2020.

We believe that this relationship was meaningfully restored over the last couple of years. The recent surge in money supply had a bigger impact on inflation than in prior years because of its sheer size and origin. The colossal $10 trillion of monetary and fiscal stimulus was unprecedented in magnitude. And stimulus checks literally took the form of inflationary “helicopter” money.

As a result, we have seen a revival of Milton Friedman’s well-known thesis that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. As goes money supply, so goes inflation. We believe this played out in a material way in 2021 and 2022. We also acknowledge that the pandemic effects of supply chain disruptions and pent-up demand further exacerbated inflationary pressures.

We show year-over-year changes in money supply and inflation in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Money Supply Growth and Inflation

Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve

Our measure of money supply is M2 which typically includes checking, savings and money market accounts. It is shown above in blue. The green line shows the year-over-year change in CPI inflation.

We see two effects playing out in this relationship. One, fiscal stimulus tends to have a bigger impact on inflation than monetary stimulus. And two, monetary stimulus generally works on a lagged basis ... typically after 6 to 12 months.

Money supply shot up and peaked at over 25% in early 2021. We believe it contributed to the spike in inflation a year later.

But from that peak, money supply growth has declined dramatically in the last year or so. There are no more stimulus checks and the Fed is now tightening.

We believe that the recent decline in money supply growth has not yet fully impacted inflation. On the same lagged basis, it will likely reduce inflation in the coming months.

We close with a final word of caution on the outlook for inflation. We do not expect inflation to abate nearly as quickly as the rate at which it shot up.

The ongoing war in Ukraine will continue to dislocate commodity prices and supply chains. And even as energy and goods inflation tails off, services inflation which includes rents and wages will likely be stickier and more persistent.

As a result, while inflation will likely recede, it will do so slowly and remain above target in 2022 and 2023. We expect core PCE inflation (Personal Consumption Expenditures) at around 4% by the end of 2022 and at about 3% by the end of 2023.

So, where does all this leave the Fed? And what do they need to do next?

The misguided belief on the Fed’s part last year that inflation would be transient leaves it in a difficult spot in 2022 – fight inflation and risk a recession or avoid a recession and risk a long inflationary spiral.

Its dilemma is further compounded at this point. The Fed finds itself at peak hawkishness with consecutive 75 basis point hikes even as inflation may be peaking.

We begin our discussion on the Fed with a quick recap of their policy responses so far. Yes, the Fed was hopelessly late in beginning its tightening cycle. But we believe they are not as far behind as the current gap between a Fed funds rate of 2.25% and July’s headline CPI print of 8.5% may suggest.

While the Fed was late to raise rates, they did use their policy tool of forward guidance to good effect in engineering a slowdown.

The Fed has clearly communicated in recent months what they expect to do in the future. As a result, financial conditions have already tightened in the form of higher interest rates, a stronger dollar and lower stock prices.

We also anticipate a lower cap to the Fed funds rate than many may fear. We believe that today’s high inflation is not simply a demand problem, it is also a supply issue. In so far as this may be true, the Fed will get some help in the fight against inflation ... and it will come from the private sector as supply chains continue to get restored.

So, should the Fed continue on its policy path or consider a pause or a pivot if inflation does peak?

The 2y-10y portion of the yield curve is already steeply inverted. At its current projected pace, the Fed will invert the short end of the yield curve as well by November.

Does the Fed have any options but to invert the entire yield curve before the end of the year?

Maybe.

The Fed’s hawkish stance has so far succeeded in preventing current inflation from becoming anchored in inflation expectations. To keep inflation expectations muted and avoid an inflationary spiral, the Fed needs to continue hiking in the foreseeable future.

But at some point in the next several months, the Fed may have some flexibility. By then, it may be able to look back at a clearly visible peak in inflation. If June proves to be that peak, the Fed may then have enough evidence of falling inflation to consider a shift in policy.

We believe a pivot to rate cuts anytime soon would be a mistake; it runs the risk of prolonging the inflationary cycle much like it did in the 1970s. We believe, however, that a “no-promises” pause in 4 to 6 months may not be as unlikely as many believe... especially if the incoming data shows a clear and convincing trend of disinflation.

We focus next on the depth and duration of a potential recession and the current bear market.

Recession and Bear Market

Investors have agonized about a long list of concerns for several months now. There is one common theme across all these sources of anxiety. Just how severe will this current bear market or a potential recession be?

We look at several factors to answer this question and conclude that the worst fears on this front may be unfounded.

We first assess the impact of higher interest rates on the broad economy. And we do so through two potential transmission mechanisms – its impact on the housing market and corporate profits.

We have addressed concerns about the housing market in our prior writings. It is true that higher mortgage rates have combined with high home prices to push mortgage costs to their highest level since 2008.

But we still refute concerns of a dire housing situation or parallels to the 2008 Financial Crisis for a number of fundamental reasons. These include a limited supply and inventory of homes, greater credit-worthiness of borrowers and a significantly lower household debt to income ratio.

We also uncover an interesting and less-understood observation related to interest expenses and corporate profits.

Corporate debt is typically laddered across a wide range of maturities. On this spectrum, variable rate and short-term debt resets almost immediately to higher interest rates; longer-term debt does not. As a result, short-lived exogenous shocks in corporate bond yields simply don’t transmit as quickly or materially to interest expenses.

We saw this phenomenon during the Global Financial Crisis and we are likely to see it this time around as well. With the abundance of easy money until last year, corporations were quick to refinance most of their debt to much longer maturities.

Less than 15% of corporate debt today is in short-term and variable rate debt. More than 30% of corporate debt has a maturity of 10 years or longer. Based on this distribution, overall interest expenses are unlikely to rise sharply any time soon.

We offer one final observation in support of our belief that any potential recession is less likely to be deep and protracted.

The strength of the U.S. economy at the beginning of the year was based on a strong U.S. consumer. The strength of the consumer in large part is derived from the health of the labor market.

Figure 2 shows that the labor market has held up surprisingly well through the turmoil this year. Cumulative job growth has handily outstripped GDP growth in 2022.

Figure 2: Employment and GDP

Untitled design (77)

Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve

Figure 2 shows two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth which suggests that we may be in a recession right now. However, it is hard to square that up with the health of the labor market. We see in Figure 2 that employment has been strong – more than 3 million new jobs have been created in 2022 through July and the unemployment rate is at 3.5%. In the same period, Gross Domestic Income (GDI) has also been positive and divergent from GDP.

The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) determines the beginning and end of recessions using several metrics. GDI and employment are two of the more important factors in their assessment. It will be curious to see if the NBER eventually labels the first half of 2022 as an official recession or not. We wouldn’t be surprised if the answer turns out be No.

We believe that the economy is strong enough where any potential recession, should it unfold, will be short and shallow.

And how about the current bear market in stocks? Could it become more severe and protracted? Is the recent uptick in stock prices the beginning of a new bull market or simply a bear market rally?

The outlook for stocks depends on how resilient corporate earnings turn out to be in the coming months. Earnings have held up remarkably well through the first half of 2022. In the first two quarters, earnings came in well above consensus expectations. 2022 earnings growth for the S&P 500 is still on track to match its 9% estimate from the beginning of the year.

While earnings estimates for 2023 have declined a bit in recent weeks, they also remain surprisingly robust. Earnings for the S&P 500 in 2023 were projected to be around 250 at their high point; they are now estimated to be 2% lower at 245.

It was widely expected that high inflation and a strong dollar in the second quarter would take a bigger toll on corporate profits. Those fears have not yet been realized. In fact, if inflation peaks in June, inflation and currency headwinds will only diminish from this point on.

In order for stocks to retrace their recent gains and create new lows, we estimate that 2023 earnings need to fall by another 10-15% to the 210-220 level. We deem this to be less likely than feared. If the devasting second quarter could dent 2023 earnings by only 2%, then subsequent quarters with weaker head-winds are unlikely to inflict greater damage.

We believe that the underlying strength of the U.S. economy and company fundamentals will allow earnings to withstand adverse inflation and currency effects.

There is still a dominant view in the investment community that the recent rebound in stock prices is simply a bear market rally that will eventually give way to new lows. We assign a greater probability to the counter view that this may be the start of a new bull market.

In summary, we do not expect the current growth scare to degenerate into a prolonged recession or a lengthy bear market.

We also look further out into the next decade and offer the following perspectives on the economy and the markets.

Longer Term Outlook

Here is a brief look at the longer term outlook for inflation, interest rates, and stock and bond returns.

The last five decades have seen 3 distinct inflation regimes. We show them in Figure 3.

Figure 3: CPI Inflation in the Last Five Decades

Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve, 2022 – year-over-year change as of July

Figure 3 shows that inflation was about 8% on average during the 1970s. It then declined to around 3% from the 1980s to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and fell even lower to around 2% after the GFC. Which of these 3 regimes are we likely to see over the next decade?

We have already argued against a prolonged 1970s type of recessionary spiral. We also believe that the 2% post-GFC inflation represents a cyclical low which may be difficult to reach in the next cycle.

The GFC was a severe financial crisis which then led to an even more pronounced deleveraging cycle in its aftermath. Absent such a strong disinflationary force and in the face of potential de-globalization, we believe inflation in the coming decade is more likely to be around 3% than around 2%.

In this setting, we expect the neutral long-term Fed funds rate to remain around 2.5-3.0%. At these levels, it will keep pace with realized inflation.

The post-GFC and post-Covid periods were characterized by low, and even negative, long term interest rates across the globe. Real interest rates, net of inflation, were significantly more negative.

We believe that this era of easy money is now over and expect interest rates to be higher in the next decade. U.S. Treasury bond yields will likely be in the 3-4% range and, as a result, real long term rates will also be positive.

We believe real GDP will settle in at a more normal level of around 1.5-2% in the next decade. This should still allow earnings to grow in the range of 6-8%.

We next assess what a fair Price/Earnings (P/E) multiple might be for stocks going forward.

We draw on historical precedent in Figure 4 to answer the question.

Figure 4: P/E Multiples by Inflation Regime.

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Source: Strategas

Figure 4 shows trailing 12-month P/Es across different inflation regimes. Stocks perform best when inflation is low and between 0 and 4%. At either extreme, both deflation and high inflation tend to destroy profit margins and compress P/E multiples.

Based on the data shown in Figure 4, our expectations of inflation around 3% and our view on interest rates, we believe that the fair P/E multiple for the S&P 500 index in the next cycle is likely to be 18-19 times trailing 12-month earnings.

We expect this economic backdrop will lead to more traditional returns for stocks, bonds and cash. It is likely that cash generates returns in the 2-3% range, bond returns are around 3-5% depending on credit exposure and stock returns are between 7-9%.

Within these ranges, investors can expect normal levels of risk premiums for bearing the risk of investing in stocks and bond over the next decade.

Summary

The sheer breadth and depth of economic uncertainty so far in 2022 has been truly unprecedented. We have rarely, if ever, seen such divergent economic and market forecasts in the past.

In an effort to filter some signals from all the noise, we summarize our key observations at this crucial juncture.

We believe:

  • Inflation will moderate from here and recede gradually
  • Short and long Treasury rates are less likely to exceed 4%
  • Any potential recession, should it unfold, is less likely to be deep and protracted
  • The bear market in stocks may well be shorter than most investors expect
  • Stocks offer more upside than downside over the intermediate term

We are mindful of the broad range of unknowns at this point and the even greater need to invest with care and prudence. We remain firmly committed to the basic principles of portfolio diversification, risk management and investing in high quality companies.

We do not expect to see a lengthy recession, should it even unfold, nor a prolonged bear market. 

 

We also expect to see a more normalized regime of inflation, interest rates and valuations in the next decade.

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Inflation And The Yield Curve

INTRODUCTION

The market turmoil of 2022 stands in sharp contrast to the Utopian backdrop of stimulative policy, low volatility and high returns seen in 2021. Persistently high inflation has caused an abrupt pivot in monetary policy. Fiscal stimulus is poised to disappear in 2022 and a couple of new global risks have recently emerged to spark fears of a recession.

The Fed announced its trifecta of hawkish policy actions in the form of tapering, rate hikes and quantitative tightening in early 2022. It has now completed tapering, implemented one 25 basis point rate hike in March and signaled the beginning of balance sheet reduction from May onwards.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th triggered another upward spiral in inflation through a rise in food and energy prices. More than two months later, the war shows no signs of abating.

And finally, China has responded to its most recent outbreak of Covid cases with sustained lockdowns in major cities and ports. The curtailment of manufacturing and shipping activity will likely prolong supply chain disruptions and sustain inflationary pressures.

U.S. interest rates have moved dramatically in response to proposed Fed policy actions. Shorter-term interest rates rose significantly towards the end of the first quarter and even inverted the yield curve in early April.

Inflation has now become even more conspicuous as the main economic and market risk. High inflation can act as a tax and slow growth by itself. It also increases the risk of a policy misstep, where overly aggressive tightening by the Fed may trigger a recession.

Both of these possibilities were potentially reflected in the recent inversion of the yield curve. Yield curve inversions have historically been useful recessionary indicators. We focus on the key topics of inflation and the yield curve to reassess the outlook for growth. Along the way, we pose and answer the following questions.

  • Can the Fed alone bring inflation down to target levels at this point?
  • Could inflation roll over on its own? If so, when and to what extent?
  • What is the typical lead time from the inversion of the yield curve to the onset of a recession?
  • Has extraordinary central bank policy distorted the information content of the yield curve?
  • What other factors may be driving the recent decline in the term premium?
  • Does a low term premium make yield curve inversions statistically more likely?

INFLATION TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

High inflation is now pervasive and ubiquitous. It has become a global phenomenon for several reasons. The coronavirus pandemic was a global crisis. The war in Ukraine has increased commodity prices worldwide. And rising Covid cases in China will affect global supply chains. Figure 1 shows how high inflation is in excess of levels targeted by domestic central banks.

Figure 1: Global Inflation in Excess of Target (%)

A chart of inflation in exchange of target (%).

Source: Whittier, FactSet, Federal Reserve Board, ECB, Bank of Canada, Reserve Bank of India, Bank of Korea, BoJ, PIMCO

Figure 1 shows that the 8.5% U.S. CPI inflation in March was 6.5% above the Fed’s target level of 2% inflation. The experience is similar across both developed and emerging economies with Japan and China being the notable exceptions.

A closer look at U.S. CPI inflation reveals some interesting trends. The post-pandemic spike in inflation has been bookended by abnormal increases in vehicle prices early on and then energy prices most recently. In a curious case of symmetry, energy prices declined last year when vehicle prices shot up in April 2021. A year later, vehicle prices declined as energy prices skyrocketed in March 2022.

In fact, energy and vehicle prices account for almost 45% of CPI inflation over the last 12 months.

One may reasonably expect their outsized impact on inflation to diminish once supply chains and energy markets are restored to some level of normalcy.

Investors have focused increasingly on the adverse impact of higher food and energy prices on overall consumer spending and economic growth.

We examine this thesis in Figure 2 which shows domestic spending on food and energy as a percent of total personal consumption expenditures.

Figure 2: Consumer Spending on Food and Energy (%)

A chart of a consumer spending on food and energy (%).

Source: J.P. Morgan Asset Management

It is encouraging to note that spending on Energy today is only 4% of the total and less than half of what it used to be in the 1980s. Combined spending on Food and Energy today is also less than half of what it used to be in the 1960s.

We offer the counter perspective that higher spending on Food and Energy may have a smaller impact on overall consumer spending than many may believe.

We finally turn to the important question of whether U.S. inflation may roll over by itself in the coming months. We pose the question not out of fond hope, but based instead on the cumulative rebalancing of global supply and demand that has taken place over the last several months.

We look for signs of a natural deceleration in core CPI in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Month-over-Month Change in Core CPI (%)

A chart of a month-over-month change in core CPI (%).

Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve

Figure 3 shows an encouraging decline in the levels of monthly change in core CPI.

Core CPI has increased at a slower pace in each of the last two months compared to the prior four months. Monthly changes from April to June 2021 were also a lot higher than those registered in recent months.

Figure 3 shows that the first big increase in the post-pandemic bout of inflation came in April 2021. Starting next month in April 2022, it is likely that favorable “base effect” comparisons from a year ago may now mitigate annual inflation measurements.

We observe separately that a number of recent inflation drivers like gasoline futures, used car prices and freight rates have all rolled over in recent weeks.

We believe that inflation will likely plateau in the coming months. However, the ongoing war in Ukraine and China’s lockdowns to combat Covid will continue to dislocate commodity, manufacturing and shipping supply chains. As a result, inflation will recede slowly and remain above target in 2022 and 2023.

INFLATION AND THE FED

The misguided belief on the Fed’s part last year that inflation would be transitory leaves it in a difficult spot now.

The war in Ukraine and China’s recent lockdowns have exacerbated inflationary pressures in the near term even as global growth slows under the weight of higher inflation and rising interest rates.

The Fed is now left to pick between the lesser of two evils. Try to control inflation and risk a recession or try to avoid a recession and risk a long inflationary spiral.

We believe that the Fed cannot afford to back off from its tightening agenda. They are already late in the process and simply cannot fall any further behind.

Having said that, it is highly unlikely that Fed policy by itself can bring inflation all the way down to target levels.

Our view is based on the simple arithmetic of monetary policy. The latest core PCE inflation reading is 5.4%. Assume for a moment that inflation doesn’t naturally roll over or supply chains don’t heal any further. In this setting, the Fed funds rate would have to go to 6% or 7% for monetary policy alone to push inflation all the way down to the target 2% level.

We do not expect the Fed to engage in such Draconian tightening. It will, nonetheless, push forward aggressively to achieve another outcome which is more modest and realistic.

We know how actual inflation can spiral out of control when inflationary fears get embedded into inflation expectations. The Fed’s recent rhetoric is aimed squarely at preventing current inflation from becoming anchored into inflation expectations.

In a sign of some modest success, longer-term inflation expectations rate still remain fairly low at around 2.5% as of mid-April.

We conclude this section with two key takeaways. At this point, the Fed needs help from the real economy to bring inflation gradually down to target. In the meantime, it seeks to establish enough credibility to manage long-term inflation expectations.

YIELD CURVE INVERSIONS

The recent inversion along most of the U.S. yield curve has sparked fears of a recession in the near term. The spread between the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield and the 2, 3, 5 and 7-year bond yields became negative at the beginning of April.

The 2-10 inversion is generally considered a reliable recessionary indicator. Inversions are generally observed when tight monetary policy leads to fears of a subsequent economic slowdown. In this setting, long-term interest rates begin to decline and end up below short-term rates.

Each of the last seven recessions was preceded by a 2-10 inversion. It is important to note that while every recession has been preceded by a 2-10 inversion, not every inversion has led to a recession.

We note that the yield curve inversions of early April lasted just a few days and have since reversed out at the time of writing.

We, nonetheless, explore the topic in light of renewed recessionary fears and in the event they re-appear in the bond market.

Lead Times and Alternate Measures

The 2-10 inversion is a leading indicator of recessions. Historical data suggests that a negative 2-10 yield spread tends to be quite early and leads an eventual recession by about 20 months on average. This lead time has ranged between 10 and 35 months at either extreme.

It is interesting to note that stock market peaks are observed closer to the onset of recessions. In other words, the 2-10 inversion typically leads the peak in stock prices as well, e.g. stock prices can go higher after the 2-10 spread inverts.

The slope of the yield curve can also be measured by the spread between the 10-year and 3-month Treasury yields. We designate this as the 3m-10y spread from here on and contrast it to the 2-10 spread discussed above.

The 3m-10y is also a reliable recession indicator. Its historical track record suggests that a recession ensues about a year after the 3m-10y spread stays inverted for about two months.

Even as the 2-10 spread became inverted, the 3m-10y spread has remained steeply positive. Proponents of a continued expansion in the cycle point to the 3m-10y spread as a rebuttal of the recession thesis.

We look at one more variation of the 3-month Treasury yield before interpreting these divergent signals.

Near-Term Forward Spread

Fed researchers have pointed out that an even more useful recessionary indicator from the yield curve is derived from the 3-month Treasury yield. The near-term forward spread is defined as the difference between the implied forward rate on 3-month Treasury bills six quarters from now and the current yield on the 3-month Treasury bill.

When this spread becomes negative, the market expects monetary policy to ease in response to the likelihood of a recession. However, the near-term forward spread is also steeply positive at this point.

Both the positive 3m-10y spread and positive near-term forward spread simply reflect the reality of a new Fed tightening cycle, e.g. the Fed plans to hike aggressively in the coming months.

How should one reconcile a flat or slightly negative 2-10 spread with a steeply positive 3m-10y spread and a steeply positive near-term forward spread?

The two 3-month indicators tend to assess the odds of a recession in the next twelve months or so. The 2-10 spread tends to have a longer lead time, which is closer to two years.

We believe the market is suggesting that a recession is less likely in the next one year than it may be in later years.

Inversions and Low Term Premium

We close out our yield curve discussion by examining an unconventional link between inversions and the level of term premium.

Treasury yields are derived from two components – expectations of the future path of short-term Treasury bonds plus a Treasury term premium.

Simply stated, the term premium is the compensation that investors demand to bear interest rate risk in holding long-term bonds. While intuitive to grasp, the term premium is not easy to measure. It is unobservable and must be estimated from the yield curve.

Figure 4 shows a popular measure of the term premium compiled by researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Figure 4: 10-Year Treasury Term Premium

A chart of a 10-Year Treasury Term Premium.

Source: Adrian, Crump and Moench, Federal Reserve Bank of New York

The secular decline in the term premium shown above has now become a topic of great interest and debate.

Figure 4 shows that the average term premium since 1985 has been around 150 basis points. In contrast, the average term premium over the last 10 years has been close to 0.

A number of reasons have been advanced to explain this decline in the U.S. term premium.

  • Central bank asset purchases
  • Glut of global savings
  • Interest in dollar-denominated assets from foreign investors
  • Demand for longer-dated assets to hedge long duration institutional liabilities
  • Disinflationary pre-pandemic pressures and forward guidance

It is easy to understand how asset purchases (quantitative easing) by the Fed for over a decade may well have distorted the bond market. It is possible that unrelenting demand from a large price-insensitive buyer can dislocate prices from fundamental values.

U.S. Treasuries are also a preferred destination for a glut of global savings, foreign investors and institutions such as pension funds who need to hedge long duration liabilities. And finally, from a sheer risk premium perspective, the long trend of disinflation prior to the pandemic along with enhanced Fed signaling and forward guidance have reduced interest rate volatility.

The topic of term premiums becomes relevant in the following context.

Fed researchers have also studied the impact of this decline in term premium on the likelihood of yield curve inversions.* They conclude that inversions are 4 to 5 times more likely statistically at today’s low level of the term premium than they are at their historically higher levels.

Yield curve inversions in a regime of low term premium may, therefore, carry less fundamental information about growth and may prove to be less reliable as a recessionary indicator.

TAILWINDS TO GROWTH

We have so far addressed several recent concerns related to a potentially higher risk of recession. We comment briefly on some of the continued tailwinds to the U.S. economy to balance out our growth outlook.

We begin with some brief comments on the housing sector. There are growing concerns that rising mortgage rates and falling affordability will soon make housing a headwind for the U.S. economy.

We allay those concerns at least partially by drawing the following comparisons to the Financial Crisis.

  • Adjustable rate mortgages are a smaller percent of mortgage applications now (< 10% vs. > 30%)
  • Home inventory in terms of months of supply is lower now (< 2 vs. > 10)
  • Household debt to income ratios are lower now (~ 100% vs. > 130%)

In addition, the labor market is strong and close to full employment. Consumer balance sheets are healthy. Consumer net worth is more than $30 trillion higher than it was prior to the pandemic. Consumer incomes are high. The U.S. consumer is still strong.

Credit spreads have also remained fairly narrow so far. And S&P 500 earnings estimates for calendar years 2022 and 2023 have continued to rise through April.

In light of these strong fundamentals in the U.S. economy, we believe a soft landing is more likely than a recession in 2022.

SUMMARY

We examine the latest developments on inflation, Fed policy and interest rates to reassess our economic outlook. Our views are summarized below.

We believe:

Inflation and the Fed

  • Inflation remains the biggest economic and market risk
  • Inflation may peak soon, but will remain above target in 2022 and 2023
  • War in Ukraine and Covid cases in China will impede the recovery of supply chains
  • Fed policy alone cannot lower inflation to target
  • Fed signaling is key to managing longer-term inflation expectations

Yield Curve

  • Term premium in the last decade has been unusually low and close to zero
  • Yield curve inversions are statistically more likely when the term premium is low
  • Yield curve indicators may now be a less reliable recessionary signal

Growth

  • A strong labor market and U.S. consumer bode well for the U.S. economy
  • Low credit spreads and rising earnings estimates do not signal any major concerns
  • Recession risks may not be as elevated as many fear

We, nonetheless, live in complicated times. We acknowledge that there are a number of complex forces at play in the current macroeconomic backdrop. We are constantly monitoring new information for any signs that may refute our constructive view on the economy.

We continue to invest client portfolios with caution, vigilance and a focus on high quality securities.

 *Haltom, Wissuchek and Wolman, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Inflation may peak soon, but will likely remain above target in 2022 and 2023.

In a regime of low term premium, yield curve inversions may prove to be a less reliable recessionary signal.

In light of strong fundamentals in the U.S. economy, we believe a soft landing is more likely than a recession in 2022.

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